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PROLOGUE 
In the fall of 1987, on the Twin Cities campus of 
the University of Minnesota, a series of lectures 
examining political and constitutional implications of 
public welfare policies over two hundred years of 
American experience was sponsored jointly by the School 
of Social Work and the Social Welfare History Archives. 
Four scholars were invited to explore themes relevant to 
the promotion of the general welfare: movements for 
welfare reform as they related to poverty a nd economic 
dependency; public policy and mental illness; the 
welfare of women, children, and famil ies; and changing 
definitions of public responsibj)jty for the welfare of 
persons unable, fo r whatever reasons, to care for them-
selves. This publication includes essays written by three 
of the major presenters: Michael Katz, professor of 
history, University of Pennsylvania; Gerald Grob, 
professor of history and research fellow of the Institute 
of Hea lth, Health Care Policy and Aging Research, 
Rutgers University; and Lela Costin, professor emeritus 
of social work, University of Illinois, U rbana-
Champaign. The fourth oral presentation by Mary 
Frances Berry, Geraldine R. Segal professor of American 
social thought, University of Pennsylvania, provided a 
stimulating and provocative discourse on current 
programs and policies seen in historical perspective, but 
we have no copy in written form for publication. 
For each ora l presentation there were two 
responses--one by H.E. Mason, professor, Department of 
Philosophy, University of Minnesota, one of whose fields 
of speciality is socia l ethics, and a second by a practi-
tioner or poHcy-maker: Josie Johnson, consultant in 
education, and civic leader; Roger Toogood, director, 
Children's Home Society of Minnesota; Allison Ashley, 
assistant commissioner, Mental Health Programs, for the 
state of M:innesota's Department of Human Services; and 
Lee Greenfield, Minnesota state legislator and chair of 
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the legislature's Committee on Health and Human 
Services. Professor Mason has provided a written 
response to the whole series for this publication. 
• * • • 
The United States Constitution of J 787, as several 
of the participants observed, was, of course, silent on the 
issue of welfare policy as commonly perceived today. 
The call in the preamble "to promote the general wel-
fa re" was essentially an exhortation of parallel sig-
nificance to the declared intent to establish justice, 
insure domestic tranquj}jty, provide for the common 
defense, and secure the blessings of liberty. These 
constituted a declaration of goals that all republics must 
seek to honor. To underline these obligations, and to 
make them functional, the authors of the Constitution 
listed as a primary responsibility of Congress, under 
Article I Section 8, the power to "lay and collect 
taxes ... to pay the debts and provide for the common 
defense and the general welfare of the United States." 
That grant of authority proved ambiguous--and 
potent--enough in time to legitimize a vast expansion of 
power on the part of national government in the 
twentieth century to regulate the economy and to 
inaugurate a patchwork system combining means-tested 
public assistance programs and social insurance systems. 
At the time of ratification, the founders clung to the 
model of the Elizabethan Poor Law (which had provided 
the structure for famjly assistance throughout the entire 
colonial era), by the terms of which responsibility to 
care for those in need rested first with family and 
second with local government. Thus it was that through-
out the thfrteen British North American colonies 
effective concern for the aged, for widows and orphans, 
and for the mentally or physicaJly incapacitated was 
expressed by units of local government--variously parish, 
town, and county. In light of that long historical 
experience, we can see clearly the intent of the Tenth 
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Amendment to the Const itution which "reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people" all implicit powers 
of governance not expressly delegated to Congress. The 
Constitution of 1787, then, created a federal system in 
which that great undefined reservoir of governmental 
authority, known as the "police power," would find 
implementation chiefly in state and local government. 
That inherent power was conceived to comprehend the 
authority to provide for the security, health, and well-
being of all the citizens. Economic and social conditions 
came in the twentieth century to require that the 
national government assume, in its own right, the power 
to act on issues affecting health, education, welfare, and 
during the New Deal years the courts came finally to 
recognize the legal validity and social necessity of 
accepting the claim of the federal government to 
primacy in initiating and financing all manner of 
welfare programs, although administrative authority 
continued, in many cases, to be shared with agencies of 
county and state governments. 
The particulars of these developments varied 
greatly--by state or reg.ion , by substance of need, by 
shape of policy, by populations at risk (the aged, the 
unemployed, dependent children, the mentally ill)--but 
over the generations, however reluctantly and prudently, 
a public responsibility to assjgt citizens in need 
constituted a central theme in American political life. 
Although the rhetoric of laissez-faire, so strong in 
the nineteenth century, has led many persons to assume 
that in the United States the ideal was always minimal 
activity by government, in practical fact governments 
(local, state, and national) always played assertive roles 
of primary significance in advancing the general wel-
fare. Colonial society had no compunctions about 
providing public assistance to needy persons--widows 
and widowers, orphans and half-orphans, neglected 
children, and the elderly. In the nineteenth century, 
loca l and state governments created institutions designed 
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to meet human needs and to maintain social order--
poorhouses; insane asylums; houses of refuge; reform 
schools; orphanages; and homes for the mentally retard-
ed, the physically handicapped, and dependent aged 
pe,rsons. ln the twentieth century came an elaborate 
extension of welfare programs and policies--workmen•s 
compensation, old age and survivors insurance, un-
employment compensation, aid to famiUes of dependent 
children, housing, public works, Medicare and Medicaid, 
and like measures. One the other hand, the United 
States remains the only modernized society without some 
form of family allowances or comprehensive health care. 
Powerful also over many generations were the 
efforts of agencies in the private, voluntary, or 
independent sectors to address issues of human welfare. 
Benevolent societies, mutual aid societies, charities, 
settlements, children's aid societies, and child guidance 
clinics provided evidence of the proliferation of 
thousands of citizens' groups that sought to allevfate or 
prevent human suffering and to promote the spread of 
social norms. Such efforts find expression today in the 
multiple programs that fall within the aegis of the 
United Way. Although in popular perception govern-
mental policies and programs in the voluntary sector 
seemed to be separate and have competing initiatives, 
they have, in fact, been mingled in a "mixed economy." 
The public and private jurisdktions are frequently 
confused. Even in the nineteenth century government 
funds were often assigned to voluntary, nonprofit 
agencies for the accomplishment of public goals. 
These and related themes are the focus of the 
essays here published. 
• • • • 
The lecture series was conceived, developed and 
chaired by Clarke Chambers, professor, Department of 
History, and Esther Wattenberg, professor, School of 
-4-
Social Work and Center for Urban and Regional Affairs. 
The series and this publication were made possible by 
generous grants from the Minnesota Humanities Commis-
sion, and the Office of the Provost and Vice President 
for Academic Affairs, the Biester-Young Lectureship 
Fund of the School of Home Economics, and the Center 
for Urban and Regional Affairs. (n-kind support was 
provided by the School of Social Work, the Department 
of History, and the Humphrey Institute of Public 
Affairs. Administrative implementation came from the 
University's Department of Professional Development 
and Conference Services, week-to-week management 
through the efficient and gracious work of Lori Graven. 
The enterprise benefited from the practical adv ice of 
Gleason Glover, president, Minneapolis Urban League; 
Joan Higginbotham, president, State League of Women 
Voters; and Barbara Kaufman, executive director, 
Minnesota Association of Voluntary Social Service 
Agencies. 
For all such support, in cash and in kind, in 
volunteered counsel and advice we arc grateful. 
Clarke A. Chambers 
Professor, Department of History 
Director, Social Welfare History Archives 
Adjunct Professor, School of Social Work 
University of Minnesota 
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HISTORIC OBSTACLES TO WELFARE REFORM 
by Michael B. Katz 
Even in this year of the bicentennial, the Consti-
tution remains silent about government's responsibilities 
for social welfare. True, the preamble exhorts govern-
ment "to promote the general welfare,'' but in the 
eighteenth century welfare did not mean state assistance 
to the poor. In fact, in our contemporary sense, welfare 
entered public discourse only in the early twentieth 
century. Its purpose was to describe modern, pro-
fessional practice and to dissociate public assistance 
from the stigma of relief, which was the term that in 
earlier centuries had signjfied the help given poor and 
otherwise dependent people. Nor can we find references 
to the functions subsumed by welfare elsewhere in the 
Constitution. As historian Howard Zinn recently 
observed, "The Constitution is silent on the right to earn 
a moderate income, silent on the rights to medical care 
and decent housing as legitimate claims of every human 
being from infancy to old age. Whatever degree of 
economic justice has been attained in this country ... 
cannot be attributed to something in the Constitution." 
Indeed, in the 1930s, when, for the first time, the 
federal government wanted to assume a major role in 
social welfare, New Dealers found the Constitution 
neither an inspiration nor a guide, but, rather, an 
impediment. 1 
I 
We should not conclude from the Constitution 's 
silence that its framers remained unconcerned with poor 
relief as a public issue. As men familiar with inter-
national political economy, they would have read the 
escalating British debates over the poor laws; witnessed 
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the growing poverty within America's port cities; paid 
taxes for poor relief; and administered its distribution. 
They omitted poor reHef from the Constitution for the 
same reason they excluded education. They did not 
consider it a responsibility of the federal government.2 
Here the framers followed British precedent. Although 
the E lizabethan Poor Laws had declared poor relief a 
public responsibility, they left its administration to local 
parishes. As they transposed the Elizabethan Poor Laws 
to the new world, the colonists, by and large, copied this 
decentralized, public system. Therefore, public poor 
relief is one of America's oldest traditions.3 
Its local base became one of the enduring features 
of poor relief in America. Throughout American his-
tory, poor relief practice varied not only among states 
but from county to county within the same state. Even 
the new federal role, first in the 1930s, and extended in 
the 1960s, could only modify but not eliminate the local 
variation in welfare practice, as the persistence of wide 
differences in AFDC benefits among states reveals. In 
1980, a Mississippi single parent family of four received, 
at most, $120 in monthly AFDC benefits compared to 
more than $500 in New York or California. Local con-
trol (now primarily at the state, rather than the town or 
county, level) thus remains one historic, structural 
feature of welfare in America. 
Despite its local base, in America public poor 
reUef always remained an important responsibility of 
government. Debates about poor laws were as vigorous 
in early nineteenth century America as in Britain and, 
national mythology notwithstanding, voluntarism never 
relieved most dependence in this country. In America, 
public funds a lways supported at least as many po2r and 
otherwise dependent people as did private charity. 
The bifurcation between public assistance and 
socia l insurance is a second enduring structural feature 
of American welfare. Public assistance is me~ns-tested 
relief given only to those whose resources fall below a 
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certain standard. Social insurance, by contrast, js not 
means tested. It is an entitlement for everyone eligible 
by virtue of fixed, objective criteria such as age, 
disability, or unemployment. Throughout American his-
tory, the public assistance model dominated poor relief, 
and social insurance developed only in the twentieth 
century with workmen's compensation and insurance for 
unemployment and old age. Today, public assistance is 
what we call welfare, and its major form is AFDC; the 
great example of social insurance, of course, is Social 
Security. 
Two points about this division between social 
insurance and public assistance need emphasis. First, it 
was not inevitable. Early social insurance advocates 
hoped for a unified and coherent system embracing all 
forms of social welfare. Not until the New Deal in the 
1930s did public policy firmly embed the distinction into 
the structure of America's welfare system. President 
Franklin Roosevelt, for one, distinguished sharply 
between the two. Although he sponsored the first fed-
era l relief pr:_ograms in American history (the Federal 
Emergency ReUef Administration and the Civilian 
Works Administration), he viewed them only as tem-
porary emergency measures, and he turned relief back to 
the states as soon as possible. Subsequent legislation 
combined with a deliberate policy of the new Social 
Security Administration to widen and solidify the 
emergent distinction between social insurance and public 
assistance. In the process, welfare became just a 
euphemism for relief.5 
As a result, American social welfare has a class 
structure. Social insurance serves everyone. Its base of 
support cuts across class lines, and much of its constitu-
ency is articulate and vigorous. Indeed, the militance of 
the middle class elderly pushed old age insurance to the 
top of the New Deal's social agenda and, nearly five 
decades later, defeated President Ronald Reagan's plans 
to trim benefits. However, its insurance ideology not• 
withstanding, Social Security remains an income transfer 
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program, Only, its supporters always obscure its 
similarities to what, derisively, Americans call welfare. 
Welfare, which is for poor people, inherits the mantle of 
poor relief, and those who depend on it lack both the 
political power to extend its benefits very far and the 
social status to erase its historic stigma. As a con-
sequence, Social Security now lifts most elderly people 
out of poverty; AFDC almost never does the same for 
the single parents with children who are its primary 
clients. Between l 970 and 1985, the average Social 
Security benefit increased 400 perc<gtt; the average 
AFDC benefit rose only 50 percent. 
A third structural feature of American welfare 
also has a long history. Political theorist Alan Wolfe has 
termed it America's franchise state, and it is one product 
of the blurred boundary between publ ic and private in 
America. Because they are so protean, the terms public 
and private (and the boundary between them) remain 
among the most difficult concepts to define in American 
history. In fact, their meaning has shjfted continuously 
over time and, on close inspection, most attempts to 
draw hard and fast distinctions between spheres simply 
break down. One reason is that for centuries govern-
ments have tried to accomplish public purposes through 
private means. In education, to take an early example, 
state governments in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries hoped to discharge their responsi-
bilities for secondary education by incorporating and 
funding local academies sponsored and controlled by 
private citizens. For years the state of New York 
provided education in New York City, first, by funding 
religious groups to run their own schools and, between 
1819 and the mid-1850s, by supporting a voluntary 
association of first citizens who conducted a vast system 
of schools for the city's children. Although they caJled 
their schools public, today we would think of them as 
private.7 
Throughout the nineteenth century, state govern-
ments also paid voluntary associations and religious 
-10-
groups to manage orphanages and institutions for most 
other classes of dependent people. In the 1960s, federal 
government support of social services expanded enor-
mously. For example, between J 965 and 1980, federal 
expenses for education, training, employment, and social 
services increased from 1.9 to 5.9 percent of the federal 
budget, or about 300 percent. Most private agencies 
probably depend on governments for at least half their 
funds, and as thefr independence has declined, their role 
has changed. Voluntary agencies have become primarily 
service providers, not innovators. Of course in another 
sphere the federal government has always relied on 
private industry for its weapons. The question is 
whether the same model should guide the way we deliver 
human services and the way we build missiles.8 
Supply-side policies always have dominated relief 
and welfare in America. This is their fourth structural 
feature. Publk policy tried to reduce poverty by 
changing the beba vior of poor people, for example, by 
frightening them with poorhouses, threatening to take 
away their children, training them in new skills, or 
regulating their sexuality. Public policy, however, has 
done little to address the reasons why so many young, 
healthy people (especially women with children) 
continue to find themselves in poverty; why one of four 
Americans fall below the poverty Hoe for some point 
during the course of a decade; or why pretransf er 
poverty (that is, the amount of poverty before govern-
ment income support programs) has not declined in the 
last twenty-five years. Of course prior to the twentieth 
century assumptions of scarcity underlay discussions of 
poverty. To all but a few dreamers it would have 
seemed preposterous to imagine its abolition. Resources 
were finite; Jjfe was harsh; most people would be born, 
live, and die in poverty. But in the late twentieth 
century assumptions of scarcity no longer dominate 
economic thought, and no inherent barriers block the 
search for macroeconomic policies that, finally, would 
attack the forces that generate poverty.9 
- I l -
Welfare in America has a fifth feature that is 
much newer: its extension of benefits to a wide and 
diverse segment of the American popuation. According 
to one expert, "By 1980 ... over 80 percent of poor 
households and 45 percent of all house3olds received a 
cash or in-kind transfer in that year.'11 The poorest 
fifth of the population receive at least half their income 
from the federal government. They depend, now, as 
much on the government as on the labor market. 
Between 1965 and 1980, the share of the f edera I budget 
spent on income security, social services, health, and 
education, training, and employment increased from 27 
to 53 percent. 11 Between 1968 and 1978, about one of 
every four Americans lived in a family that received 
welfare (excluding Social Security, veterans' pensions, 
and medical assist a nee) during the decade.12 This wide 
diffusion of benefits, which dates from the latter 1960s, 
resulted from a variety of sources. Some were demo-
graphic: the growing proportion of elderly people and 
single-parent families. Some stemmed from program 
participation: the massive increase Jn the proportion of 
eligible families claiming AFDC in the late 1960s. And 
some reflected policy: for example, administr'ative 
changes in eligibility standards; the transformation of 
the food stamp program in the late l 960s; the passage of 
Medicare and Medicaid in 1965; and the melding of 
programs into Supplemental Social Security in 1972. 
Nonetheless, despite its expansion between 
roughly 1965 and 1980, America's social welfare system 
remains incomplete. This is a last important structural 
feature. America is the only major Western country 
without national health insurance or a system of family 
allowances. Among industrial democracies, only Japan 
spends less of its gross national product on social 
welfare. More than one of every five children in 
America lives in poverty. Infant mortality, at 11 per 
100,000, places America seventeenth among Western 
nations. The rate for blacks, 19 per I 00,000 ( compared 
to 11 per 100,000 for whites), is more similar to the 
Third World than to other modern developed nations. 
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Without a major shift in public priorities, homelessness 
and hunger wi ll continue to increase, and young black 
men will remain without work. Between 1955 and J 984, 
the percentage ratio of employment to the total popula-
tion of black I 8 and 19 year old ma Jes dropped from 66 
to 34; for whites it remained nearly identical (64.2 and 
60.1). In 1983, only 45 percent of black men aged 16 jo 
21 were employed compared to 73 percent of whites.1 
America's economy remains unable to check the 
forces that generate poverty, and its social welfare 
system cannot a1Jeviate the consequences. No one, in 
fact, likes America's welfare system. Poor people find it 
demeaning and inadequate: liberals consider it incom-
plete and irrational; conservatives, who thfok it too 
expensive, believe it erodes the work ethic and 
encourages immorality. The unplanned, uncoordinated, 
rickety foundation upon which American welfare rests 
explains part of its weakness. But it does not account 
for its resilience. Why has this unsatisfactory, often 
irrational, system proved so resistant to change? The 
answer lies in a combination of its historic purposes, the 
ideas on which it rests, and the interests it serves. 
II 
Throughout American history, poor relief and 
welfare have served four purposes. They are: the 
alleviation of distress; the regulation of the labor 
market; the regulation of behavior; and political 
mobilization. More recent is a fifth: attacking the 
consequences of racism. The first of these purposes, the 
alleviation of distress, is straightforward. One major 
role of relief has always been the prevention of death 
from starvation, homelessness, or the lack of medical 
care. This objective, it is important to emphasize, has 
not included removing poor people from poverty, or 
even offering them very much comfort and dignity. 
Rather, survival has been the primary goal. Whether 
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public policy or private philanthropy should lift poor 
people above mere survival has remained a contentious 
question. Unfortunately for poor people, the mean-
spirited quality of most actual responses has contra• 
dicted cherished myths of generosity in the American 
past. 
The right to survival serves only as an initial 
principle of policy and does not dictate answers to 
important and difficult practical questions. Neither 
public nor private resources alone, nor their combina-
tion, can supply the wants of everyone who asks for 
help. Resources are finite. Some line must be drawn, 
some criteria determined, someone's misery defined as 
illegitimate. During the last two centuries, definitions 
of legitimate need have shifted. Partly, criteria have 
reflected changes in the contours of poverty accompany-
ing the successive social, economic, and demographic 
transformations of America. They also have revealed 
shifting ideas about the sources of poverty, human 
nature, and the role of government. 
For centuries, within cities three major groups 
have suffered disproportionate poverty. They are 
women family heads with children, old people, and the 
unemployed. Until the last few decades, most women 
living alone with children were widows; and virtuous 
widows evoked the most consistent sympathy from 
public officials and private charity. For nearly every-
one realized that women, especially with children, 
lacked any legal or moral way to earn a living. Only in 
recent decades, as AFDC recipients have become less 
often widows and more often young, unmarried, and 
black, have women with children lost their place among 
the deserving poor. In most cities, female benevolent 
societies emerged as the earliest, or among the very first, 
charitable associations. lo the early twentieth century, 
mothers' pensions became the first state-mandated 
income support programs. AFDC, supplemented by food 
stamps, Medicaid, and sometimes subsidized housing, 
now support women with children, but they neither lift 
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them out of poverty nor, with few exceptions, help them 
toward independence. 
Prior to the twentieth century, the status of old 
people fluctuated more than sentiment about poor 
widows. For the first three-quarters of the nineteenth 
century, they too usually evoked sympathy. However, 
although their material circumstances had not improved 
in any way, hardening attitudes toward poverty and 
relief in the third quarter of the nineteenth century 
significantly lessened sympathy for the elderly. Increas-
ingly, public and private relief officials argued that 
most of them had fallen into poverty because of their 
feckless and immoral behavior. Attitudes toward old 
men were especially harsh. Public officials much more 
readily granted outdoor relief to women, and adult 
children more often took in their aging mothers than 
fathers. Men who found themselves poor in old age, 
many believed, deserved little sympathy because they 
either had failed to work hard enough or to save for 
their declining years. Only when old people capitalized 
on their political power did they win significant gains. 
Social Securfty in the 1930s, and its extension thtee 
decades later, reflected political and demographic 
realities, not a shift in status or sentiment. As a result 
of their power, the elderly have emerged as the major 
social policy winners in the last twenty years. Poverty 
among them has fallen about two-thirds. Despite their 
continuing unmet needs, their incidence of poverty now 
matches the rate for the population as a whole. 14 
Unlike women with children or old people, un-
employed men aroused nearly universal sympathy only 
during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Otherwise, 
they have remained the pariahs among the poor. Myths 
of the availability of work for all able bodied men (and 
they have always been myths) have tinged the unem• 
ployed with the aroma of laziness and, for centuries, 
public and private policies unsuccessfully tried to drive 
them from the rolls of relief and, later, welfare. As a 
result, asjde from unemployment insurance (which sup• 
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ports a decreasing proportion of those without work and 
offers nothing to those who have not recently been part 
of the regular labor force), unemployed men and non-
employed women with children, as long as they are 
neither elderly nor disabled, find few sources of support. 
State General Assistance programs, one modern euphe-
mism for outdoor relief, remain tiny, restrictive, and 
inadequate. Given current levels of unemployment and 
housing costs, one result has been the growth in 
homelessness and hunger.15 
Relief and welfare policy reflects a second pur-
pose as old and pervasive as the alleviation of distress. I 
refer to the regulation of the labor market. The impact 
of income support on the supply and cost of labor is the 
most ancient and enduring issue in discourse about 
poverty and welfare. Will welfare erode the will to 
work? Will overly generous relief policies force a rise in 
wages? Who will accept a hard, boring, badly paid job 
if welfare is an option? Always, the doctrine of less 
eligibility has governed relief and welfare policy. 
Benefits 9ever should match or exceed the standard of 
living attainable by working for the lowest ordinary 
wages. These concerns helped prompt the attempted 
substitution of poorhouses for outdoor relief in the early 
nineteenth century. If incarceration became the price of 
survival, so people thought, the poor would be less eager 
to ask for relief and more willing to work. (The adop-
tion of poorhouses as official policy, it should be 
pointed out, had other complex sources as well,) In the 
third quarter of the nineteenth century, concern with 
labor market effects also underlay the new Scientific 
Charity movement's harsh attempts to evaluate male 
applicants for relief by compelling them to submit to a 
work test (usually chopping wood or breaking stone). In 
the twentieth century, Southern agricultural interests 
fought to keep state welfare benefits low, objected to 
the wages paid by re}jef programs in the New Deal, and 
retarded the extension of Social Security to farm work-
ers. Welfare's potential impact on work incentives 
stimulated the expensive and i nconclusive guaranteed 
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income experiments of tht> 1960s and I 97gs and framed 
debates about income support programs. 1 
Cycles of expansion and contraction punctuate 
the history of public welfare. Indeed, as Frances Fox 
Piven and Richard Cloward have argued, attempts to 
regulate the labor market have encouraged the extension 
of relief as well as its contraction. Public authorities 
have expanded relief primarily during depressions 
(although during some depressions they have cut it). 
They have wanted to preserve a reasonably healthy labor 
reserve for better times and to forestall the mi)j tance 
that always threatens to erupt among people who are 
• angry, starving, and out of work. Labor market con-
cerns even shaped relief policies on a local level. In the 
late nineteenth century, for instance, none of the cities 
along the Great Lakes abolished outdoor relief, despite 
the urging of reformers and the example of several other 
major cities. They resisted, I believe (although more 
research on this point is needed}, because they wanted to 
support workers during the winter when the lakes froze 
and work stopped. Without relief during the winter, the 
labor they would need in the spring would migrate 
elsewhere or die of starvation. 7 
Welfare policy also has tried to regulate the 
behavior of the poor. In part, this third purpose has 
been political. Its goal has been to dampen or forestall 
miUtance among workers who might form unions or 
among poor people who otherwise might riot or join 
together in powerful political movements. For example, 
in the early twentieth century, some progressive indus-
trialists developed programs, later referred to as welfare 
capHalism, with which to win their workers' loyalty and 
prevent the forma tion of unions. Decades later, the 
expansion of Great Society programs in the late J 960s 
followed the explosions in urban ghettos.18 
Moral anxieties also have prompted the use of 
welfare to regulate the behavior of the poor. For 
reformers more often have located the source of poverty 
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in character flaws than in external conditions. Through-
out the nineteenth century most commentators pointed to 
alcohol abuse as the greatest source of poverty, and they 
attacked it by promoting tempe rance and trying to force 
poor people into poorhouses where they supposedly 
(though not always in fact) could not drink. The other 
major, an.d related,-character flaw was laziness or an 
unwillingness to work. Here, too, poorhouses and other 
punitive strategies attempted to reform behavior through 
compulsory work or by frightening poor people out of 
tbefr sloth. In the South in the 1940s and 1950s, 
allegations about the sexual behavior of black women 
stimulated the introduction of "suitable home" provisions 
into AFDC regu lations. Indeed, today, moral concerns 
about sexuality suffuse discourse about unmarried 
adolescent mothers on whom the responsibility for 
America's urban pathology and welfare problems are 
unfairly and inaccurately placed. Consider, as one 
example, proposals to restrict AFDC payments to only 
those adolescent mothers wgo live with their parents or 
in approved group homes. 1 
Political mobilization remains welfare's fourth 
historic purpose. Relief and welfare always have been 
part of the patronage apparatus through which 
politicians have garnered votes. In the nineteenth 
century, local politicans used rcHef policies not only to 
win the votes of the poor, but also to appeal to small 
businessmen and local professionals. Contracts for 
supplying poorhouses with food and fuel enriched local 
merchants. Orders for food redeemable at local stores 
helped support grocers. Cash relief often found its way 
to saloonkeepers. Contracts for medical care augmented 
the income of local doctors. In the I 930s, welfare policy 
became one way the New Deal lured black voters away 
from the Republican party and, subsequently, it helped 
cement the allegiance of minorities and the urban poor 
to the Democrats. Indeed, in 1963, President Kennedy 
told Walter Heller, then chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisers, that political imperatives demanded 
a program targeted directly at the poor, partly because 
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the recent tax cut had helped only the middle class. 
Conversely, opposition to relief and welfare also has 
persisted as a historic means for mobilizing political 
support. In the 1870s, Brooklyn's Republican reformers· 
capitalized on the graft that infected the city's welfare 
system not only to abolish outdoor relief but to ride to 
political power. The new mayor, Seth Low, later also 
mayor of New York City and president of Columbia 
University, was only one of a series of politicians to ride 
the anti-welfare theme to political power, as we have 
witnessed in much more recent times.20 
lo the 1960s a new objective joined welfare's four 
historic purposes. It was the use of social policy to 
attack the consequences of racism. The Civil Rights Bill 
of 1964 and the voting rights legislation of 1965 
completed the first phase of the movement's agenda; the 
great Watts Riot in Los Angeles in 1965 peeled away the 
remaining covers from the anger, despair, and frustra-
tion that remained within urban ghettos. In the after-
math of these events, civil rights leaders, including Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., increasingly stressed the 
connection b'etween discrimination and poverty, and 
they argued that welfare reform, job creation. and 
income support were essential to progress for blacks. 
Issues of race and economic justice fused, to take one 
example, in the welfare rights movement, inspired and 
led by black women. They joined, as well, to help ignite 
the War on Poverty and sustain its one potentially radi-
cal innovation: its emphasis on maximum feasible par-
ticipation and community participation. Even though 
the War on Poverty failed in its ultimate objective, it 
opened to a new generation of minority leaders (many of 
them women) their first official channels to politics and 
power.21 
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III 
Conflicts between welfare's historic purposes 
have helped defeat fundamental reform. So has the 
complex tangle of interests served by relief and welfare 
Most of these are implicit in what has already been des-
cribed. In a bumbling way, the current welfare system 
continues to help regulate labor markets, although its 
inefficiencies probably have helped prompt the current 
interest in reform. Employers in low wage service 
industries confront a labor shortage while millions of 
women remain out of the work force, supported by 
AFDC. This, I suspect, has fueled calls for welfare 
reform defined as workfare, or forcing women with 
children into primarily low wage, dead-end jobs. 
Welfare also has a huge and often vocal clientele among 
the large fraction of Americans (remember by no means 
all poor) who draw on its diverse benefits. Even more, 
the welfare system has turned into a vast employer of 
the middle class. Especially through the social services, 
the expansion of welfare has created a great interlocking 
public and private bureaucracy dependent not only on 
public f unds but on the structural arrangements they 
support. Welfare reform, whether in the form of cutting 
benefits or redesigning their delive11 now confronts a smart, powerful internal opposition. 
Ideas about poverty and poor people have com• 
pounded the barriers to welfare reform. Most important 
is the ancient preoccupation with classifying poor 
people, reflected in the historic distinction between the 
deserving and the undeserving poor. 1,'his moral distinc-
tion replaced older divisions between neighbors and 
strangers; able bodied and impotent; and the poor and 
paupers. Pauper originated as an administrative 
category. Paupers were (and strictly speaking still are) 
recipients of public relief. Although by itself poverty 
carried no stigma, pauperism did. During the early 
nineteenth century, the distinction between poverty and 
paupedsm hardened, and commentators increasingly 
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attributed the latter to moral sources. This transmuta-
tion of pauperism into a moral category tarrusbed all the 
poor. Despite the effort to maintain fine distinctions, 
poverty itself increasingly became not the natural 
consequence of misfortune, but the willful result of 
indolence and vice. 
The redefinition of poverty as a moral condition 
accompanied the transition to capitalism and democracy 
in early nineteenth century America. It served to justify 
the mean spirited treatment of the poor, which, in turn, 
checked expenses for poor relief and provided a power-
ful incentive to work. In this way the moral definition 
of poverty helped assure the supply of cheap labor in a 
market economy increasingly based on unbound wage 
labor. The moral redefinition of poverty followed also 
from the identification of market success with divine 
favor and personal worth. Especially in America, where 
opportunity awaited everyone with energy and talent, 
poverty signaled personal failure. The ubiquity of work 
and opportunity, of course, were myths, even i.n the 
early republic. The transformation in economic rela-
tions, the growth of cities, immigration, the seasonality 
of labor, fluctuations in consumer demand, periodic 
depressions, low wages, restricted opportunities for 
women, industrial accidents, high mortality, and the 
absence of any social insurance all embedded chronic 
poverty and dependence into the structure of American 
social !if e.23 
Persistent and increasing mfaery did not soften 
the moral definition of poverty. Neither did the 
evidence available through early surveys or the records 
of institutions and administrative agencies.24 Instead, 
the definition hardened until nearly the end of the 
nineteenth century. As a consequence, public policy and 
private charity remained mean, punitive, and inade-
quate. With tiresome consistency, moral definitions of 
poverty found support in the latest intellectual fashions: 
in the antebellum period, Protestant theology~ after the 
Civil War, in the work of Darwin and early hereditarian 
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theory; and, in the twentieth century, in eugenics. So 
deeply embedded in Western culture had the distinction 
between the deserving and undeserving poor become that 
even writers on the left invoked it automat ically or 
translated it into their own vocabulary. Thus, Marxists 
wrote about the "lumpenproletaria rt," and the · 
Progressive-era reformers who, starting in the 1890s, 
rejected individual explanations of poverty, unreflec-
tively used the old distinctions. Even Robert Hunter, a 
Socialist, whose widely-read book Poverty (published in 
1904) traced dependence to its structural sources, used 
the hoar~ distincti%n between the deserving and 
undeserving poor. 
The moral classification of the poor survived 
even the Great Depression. To be sure, poverty lost 
much of its moral censure as unemployment reached cat-
astrophic levels. But relief remained pejorative and 
degrading, and the unemployed turned to the state for 
help usually only as a last resort, after they had 
exhausted all other possibilities of survival. President 
Franklin Roosevelt hardly could wait to move the fed-
eral government out of the business of relief, which it 
had reluctantly and temporarily entered in J 933, and the 
foundation of the social welfare edifice erected by his 
administration became the distinction between public 
assistance and social insurance that assured public policy 
would continue to discriminate igvidiously between 
categories of dependent people.2 
During the Second World War and the prosperous 
fifties, poverty received little explicit attention by social 
scientists. However, the rhetoric surrounding controver-
sies about public welfare (especially Aid to Dependent 
Children) showed tha~ the moral classification of poor 
people had persisted.2 In the nineteenth century, 
asking for relief became a sign of individual failure, 
and no label carried a greater stigma than pauper. By 
the second half of the twentieth century, some groups in 
need of help had been moved out of the pauper class. 
Most old people, workers disable~ in accidents, some of 
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the unemployed (not to mention veterans, always a 
special category) could claim help as a right through 
social insurance. Others, most notably women who 
headed famjlies with children, remained dependent on 
means-tested public assistance, morally tarred , as always, 
by their association with relief. 
In the early 1960s intellectuals and politicians 
rediscovered poverty, Sustained economic growth and 
celebrations of affluence had hidden the stubborn 
persistence of deprivation and dependence, and 
Americans appeared shocked to discover that between 40 
and 50 mjllion among them were, by any objective 
measure, poor.29 To interpret the meaning of these no 
longer avoidable and disheartening facts, social scientists 
drew on a new concept: the culture of poverty. The 
culture of poverty did not have the classification of 
poor people as its primary purpose. Still, it served the 
same end. For most writers observed that the culture of 
poverty did not capture all poor people. Rather, it 
p laced in a class by themselves those poor people whose 
behaviors and values converted their poverty into an 
enclosed and self-perpetuating world of dependence. 
Although some of its exponents located the sources of 
poverty in objective factors, the new concept resonated 
with traditional moral definitions. The culture of 
poverty could not quite sanitize the poor; their ancient 
odor seeped through the antiseptic layers of social 
science. They remained different and inferior because, 
whatever their origins, the actions and attitudes of poor 
people themselves assured their continued poverty and 
the poverty of their children. Despite the liberalism of 
its originators, by the 1970s the culture of poverty had 
become a conservative concept, thought of as a 
justification for mean and punitive policies. 
By the mid-J 980s, a new image dominated poverty 
discourse. Invoked unreflectively and automatically by 
commentators on poverty, underclass captured the 
mixture of alarm and hostility that t inged the emotional 
response of more affluent Americans to the poverty of 
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blacks increasingly clustered and isolated in central 
cities. What bothered observers most was not their 
suffering. Rather, it was their sexuality, expressed in 
teenage pregnancy; family patterns, represented by 
female-headed households; alleged reluctance to work 
for low wages; welfare dependency, incorrectly believed 
to be a major drain on national resources; and propen-
sity for drug use and violent crime, which had eroded 
the safety of the streets and subways. Despite the 
precision with which serious social scientists, notably 
William J. Wilson, brought to the concept, underclass 
emerged from the work of Ken Auletta and Nicholas 
Lemann, its two most widely ready popularizers, as 
imprecise, with its sources specified either inadequately 
or inaccurately. The underclass seemed little more than 
the most modern euphemism for the undeserving poor. 
Like other moral classifications of the poor used 
throughout American history, underclass inhibits reform. 
Aside from the moral judgment it implies, underclass 
focuses debate on a subset of the poor. It deflects 
attention away from comprehensive social policies and 
encourages targeted approaches that historically have 
isolated their beneficiaries and reinforced the stigma 
attached to poverty and relief. Underclass also revives 
discredited notions of the culture of poverty by high-
lighting the behavior of poor people rather than the 
sources of their poverty. One last implication is even 
more serious: by diffusing an image of poor people as 
split into two sharply divided groups, underclass helps 
perpetuate their political powerlessness by strengthening 
the barriers that for so long have divided them against 
each other. 
Its market-based framework also has constrained 
debate about poverty and welfare. This hegemony of 
market models in poverty discourse has two effects. 
First, by accepting the separation of economics and 
politics introduced in nineteenth century liberal thought, 
poverty discourse reifies the market as the regulator of 
economic relations. Intrusion in the market or inter-
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ference with its natural working becomes, by definition, 
.illegitimate and destructive. Government policy that 
redistributes or supports income is redefined as contrary 
to the laws of nature. At the same time, market models 
evaluate the reciprocal obligations of public policy and 
the poor in terms of exchange. With only a few excep-
tions (most notably, in recent years, bishops in the 
Catholic Church), both conservative and liberal welfare 
analysts use as their criteria wage-rates, productivity, 
and economic efficiency. For instance, during the years 
of the Great Society between 1965 and 1980, the major 
concern of the liberal economists who dominated poverty 
research remained the impact of income supports on 
work incentives. With the partial exception of legal 
scholars and moral philosophers, no recent American 
students of poverty and welfare have advanced the 
theoretical foundations of the welfare state or tran-
scended the conventional boundaries of a liberalism that 
almost everyone agrees has grown stale. This intellectual 
and moraJ bankruptcy among the welfare state's support-
ers eased the way for the conservative revival. Jn fact, 
together, liberals and conservatives have produced a 
literature bounded by a narrow and constricted vision of 
social bonds and obligations. As much as the historic 
division of poor people into moral categories, the 
assimilation of social obligations by the marketplace 
retards the rejection of worn out ideas and th} formula-
tion of just and compassionate public policies. 9 
IV 
The legacy of American welfare seems a gloomy 
mix of contradictory purposes, entrenched interests, 
intellectual rationalization, and moral callousness. And 
so it is. Nonetheless, some possibilities, bits of hope, 
lurk amid thjs dark, resilient tangle. Let me conclude 
by pointing to four of them. 
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First we now possess the resources to alleviate all 
poverty in America. Unlike nineteenth century reform-
ers, we need not start with assumptions of scarcity. 
Even the budget deficit and potential energy shortages 
cannot entirely obscure the abundance of American life. 
ln fact, the costs of eliminating poverty pale beside 
those for defense and space exploration. About $ I 5 
billion would lift almost all women on AFDC above the 
poverty line. Every year we pay billions of dollars to 
farmers not to grow crops that could feed hungry people. 
American technology never has been unleashed on the 
housing and infrastructural problems in its cities. 
Second, we have entered a new phase in the dia-
lectic of reform. Ronald Reagan's greatest service to the 
poor has been to arouse defenders of the welfare system 
from their lethargic complacency. His cutbacks, both 
proposed and real, have promoted a new coaHtion of 
liberals and radicaJs who, not long ago, fought each 
other instead of their common opponents. Besides the 
formation of new political alliances, scholarship has 
revived as historians and social scientists have begun to 
re-explore poverty and welfare with unprecedented 
sophistication and an intensity unmatched for at least 
two decades. The l 980s could be the dawn of a golden 
age of American writing about poverty and welfare and 
even of creative proposals for public policy. 
Third, the New Deal and the Great Society pro-
vided a solid record of government achievement. They 
showed that government in America can be a great force 
for social progress. Between the early 1960s and the late 
1970s, the federal government reduced the incidence of 
poverty among the elderly by about two-thirds; vastly 
increased the ava ilability of medical care for the poor; 
decreased hunger and malnutrition; and grea t ly expand-
ed the stock of low cost housing. As with the great dvil 
rights legislation of the same years, none of these accom-
plishments are complete, and many have been stalled, if 
not partly reversed. But they stand as both a legacy a nd 
a precedent. 
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Finally, America's welfare system is not the result 
of an inexorable response to urban-industrial society, 
modernization, or some other great impersonal impera-
tive. It is a historical product, the result of choices 
among alternative possibilities made at different 
moments during more than two centuries of American 
history. The women and men who built America's wel-
fare system~ of course, lacked complete freedom. 
Resource shortages, politics, ideology, even the 
Constitution, all constrained the possibilities before 
them. But they never lacked alternatives, and debates 
among sane, intelligent people marked the creation of 
relief and welfare policy at every point. One moral, I 
think, is this: the reason for studying history is to 
transcend it, not to become its prisoner. Because far 
more possibilities exist than we usually allow ourselves 
to imagine, the greatest contemporary obstacles are a 
lack of will and imagination. America, in the last 
ana lysis, will have just as much poverty as it wants. 
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PUBLIC POLICY AND MENTAL ILLNESS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
• by Gerald N. Grob 
I 
The American political system, which divided 
authority and power to govern between the central and 
sovereign state governments, has had both admirers and 
critics. Indeed, during the nineteenth century the 
federal Consti tution became a model for many nations 
seeking to escape monarchical and colonial absolutisms 
of one sort or another. Yet the consequences of the 
peculiar nature of the American system of government 
have often been ignored. There has been little or no 
effort to relate political structure and public policy, if 
only because most scholars have assumed that more 
fundamental determinants (e.g. economic) shape social 
and political processes. Using the mentally ill as a case 
study, 1 should like to demonstrate how a partic.ular 
constitutional system or structure of government can 
affect public policy. This is not to argue that govern-
mental structure plays the most decisive role. It is only 
to suggest that the distinctive American framework of 
government helped to shape certain kinds of policies. 
Before the American Revolution the problems 
posed by mentally ill were relatively minor. Population 
density tended to be low, and most communities were 
predominantly rural or agricultural. Hence the number 
of mentally ill people was never large, and most were 
* The research for this paper was supported by a grant 
from the National Institute of Mental Health (MH39030), 
Pub)jc Health Service, U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services. 
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dealt with on an ad hoc or informal basis by either the 
family or local officials. As a matter of fact, the 
mentally ill became a matter of public concern only if 
they were unable to care for themselves or lacked a 
family. In such instances they came under the jurisdic-
tion of the English Poor Law system whose foundations 
antedated the passage of the famous Elizabethan Poor 
Law legislation between 1597 and 1601. This system was 
based on the principle that society had corporate obliga-
tion for poor and dependent persons, and virtually every 
American colony enacted legislation that recreated the 
English arrangement. Under this system local communi-
ties, rather than the colony or mother country, had fiscal 
and supervisory responsibility for those persons incap-
able of surviving without some form of assistance. The 
preoccupation of the British and colonia l governments 
with imperial issues only reinforced the absence of any 
efforts to forge systematic social policies to deal with 
dependent persons. 
The creation of a federal system of government 
in the 1780s was hardly significant insofar as -care of 
the ill or dependent was concerned. Two centuries of 
imperial rule had created grave mjstrust toward any 
centralized authority. The federal Constitution in many 
respects institutionalized these misgivings by sharply 
restricting the authority of the federa l government and 
by retaining a large reservoir of power for the states. 
The Tenth Amendment explicitly stated that the "powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution" 
were "reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.'' However the Constitution is interpreted, it is 
clear that its authors believed that responsjbility for . 
health and welfare resided with state and local govern-
ments and not the national government. Consequently, 
social welfare in the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries revolved around state and local governments 
acting in concert with various private organizations and 
indJviduals. 
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11 
The agricultural and rural character of American 
society in the Revolutionary and post·Revolutionary era 
precluded any serious consideration of structural 
changes to deal with ill or dependent persons. After 
1800, however, new circumstances created conditions 
that ultimately led to a reliance on some form of 
institutional care of the mentally ill. A chain of 
circumstances-·demographic changes (including popula• 
tion growth, geographical mobility, urbanization, and 
immigration), a growing awareness of social and medical 
problems, a consequent transformation in attitudes 
toward and perceptions of mental illnesses, a surge in 
philanthropic giving by elites, increased knowledge of 
medical and psychiatric innovations in France and 
England, and religious and intellectual innovations••all 
combined to give rise to a movement to establish institu• 
tions specializing in the care and treatment of the 
insane. The transforma tion of insanity into a social 
problem requiring state intervention (as contrasted with 
familial and community responsibility) was by no means 
unique; the nineteenth century was notable for its 
proliferation of institutional solutions and the transfer 
of functions from families to public or quasi•public 
structures. In 1820 only one state mental hospital 
existed in the United States, but by the Civil War 
virtually every state had established one or more public 
institutions for the care and treatment of the mentally 
ii I. 
The founding of these public hospj tals, however, 
did not occur io a socjal or political vacuum. The 
tradition of local autonomy that had grown out of two 
centuries of colonjal experience continued to influence 
both the creation and the administration of welfare 
policies. In theory, the powers of communities derived 
from and were dependent on the actions of sovereign 
state governments. In practice, however, localities had 
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de facto authority to deal with many of the problems 
relating to dependency. Much of the early legislation 
pertainjng to the mentally ill, therefore, continued to be 
based on the assumption that local communities would 
share responsibility with the state government. The old 
colonial tradition of local autonomy continued even at a 
time when rapid social and economic change prompted 
greater centralization. 1n general, state legislatures 
provided the capital funds necessary for acquiring a site 
and constructing a physical plant, as well as providing 
for expansion and renovation. Local communities, on 
the other hand, were required to pay the hospital a sum 
equal to the actual cost of care and treatment of each 
patient. The system, moreover, did not assume that 
every mentally ill person would be committed to a state 
institution. Only dangerous mentally ill individuals 
were required to be sent to state hospitals. Others who 
could benefit from therapeutic interventions (and thus 
ultimately removed from the welfare rolls) could, at the 
discretion of local officials, be institutionalized. The 
system, in short, involved divided responsibility. For 
much of the nineteenth century, therefore, a significant 
proportion of insane persons were kept within the com-
munity, often in municipal almshouses. Families with 
sufficient private resources could commit their relatives 
to state institutions, but only if they were willing to pay 
for their upkeep. Finally, most states accepted fiscal 
responsibility for individuals who did not have a legal 
residence, such as incoming immigrants. 
Practices. to be sure, varied somewhat from state 
to state and region to region. Some paid the salaries of 
hospital officials directly our of the state treasury. 
Others provided subsidies so that communiti_es would 
pay a sum below the actual cost. Some required local 
officials to pay for patients whose families were in-
dependent but could not afford the costs of protracted 
care. And some, as a result of experience, assumed all 
the charges of supporting either poor or indigent 
patients. Nevertheless, the presence of individual varia-
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tions did not conceal the fact that jurisdiction over the 
mentally ill was divided between two (unequal) levels of 
government--state and local. 
Dual responsibility for the mentally ill had sig-
nificant repercussions. The system tended to promote 
competition and rivalries that were inhe rent in over-
lapping governmental jurisdictions. In many states the 
stipulation that individual communities were financially 
liable for their poor and indigent insane residents creat-
ed an incentive for local officials to retain them in 
almshouses where costs were lower. If the state, on the 
other hand, assumed fiscal responsibility for all mentally 
ill persons, localities were apt to send their patients to 
state hospitals in order to relieve their constituents from 
any fiscal burden. Many hospitals were also adversely 
affected by a divided governmental structure. The 
patient charge (generally set by the legislature) was 
often insufficient or marginal; slow and delinquent pay-
ments by local authorities caused severe cash-flow 
problems; and inadequate or tardy state appropriations 
compounded existing difficulties. Hospital officials, 
moreover, faced unremitting pressure from communities 
to discharge patients in order to save money irrespective 
of their condition. Local authorities on occasion went so 
far as to try to force hospitals to reimburse the com-
munity for work performed by patients even though 
such labor was part of a therapeutic regimen. 
Cognizant of the administrative and humanitar-
ian problems created by divided authority, a number of 
states moved to assume total responsibility for all 
persons in public mental hospitals. This tendency was 
most apparent in the more recently settled western states. 
By 1860 Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and 
California paid the full costs of hospitalization irrespec-
tive of the patient's financial situation. Kentucky, 
Missouri, Louisiana, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Georgia 
limited their support to the pauper insane. Other states 
modified their laws by contributing to the operating 
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budget of mental hospitals, paying salaries, or providing 
a fixed appropriation. Although easing tensions, such 
developments did not resolve the problem, if only be-
cause available facilities during the nineteenth century 
were incapable of accommodating all cases of mental 
illnesses. 
For virtually all of the nineteenth and a good 
part of the twentieth century the federal gover nment 
was not involved with mental health policy. The only 
effort to expand its role was undertaken by Dorothea L. 
Dix, the redoubtable advocate of public institutional 
care for the mentally ill. In 1848 she presented a 
lengthy memorial to Congress requesting legislation that 
provided for the distribution of five milJion acres of 
federal land to the states, the proceeds of which would 
be used for the support of the indigent insane. Prece-
dents for such a subsidy already exjsted, since educa-
tional institutions and railroads had already benefited 
from federal land grants. 
For six years Dix labored strenuously ;to persuade 
members of Congress that the project was desirable and 
important. Initially legislators evinced little interest in 
the bill; the sectional conflict that had intensified after 
the end of the Mexican War absorbed their time and 
energies. Her determined and persistent lobbying, how-
ever, soon paid dividends. When the thirtieth Congress 
permitted the bill to lapse, Dix returned with a bill 
requesting more than twelve million acres, and sub-
sequently asked for an appropriation to establish an 
insane hospital for military personnel to be located in 
the District of Columbia. 
Much of the debate in Congress revolved around 
the constitutional question of whether the federal 
government possessed legal authority to use the public 
domain for such projects. In 1854 Congress finally 
passed a bill granting ten million acres to the states for 
the support of the indigent insane. Dix's ecstasy over 
-38-
her success proved of short duration, for the act met 
with a presidential veto. "1 cannot but repeat what I 
have before expressed," wrote Franklin Pierce in his 
message to Congress, "that if the several States, many of 
which have already laid the foundation of munificent 
establishments of local beneficence, and nearly all of 
which are proceeding to establish them, shall be led to 
suppose, as they will be, should this bill become a law, 
that Congress is to make provision for such objects, the 
fountains of charity will be dried up at home, and the 
several States, instead of bestowing their own means on 
the social waots of their own people, may themselves, 
through the strong temptation, which appeals to States as 
to individuals, become humble supplicants for the 
bounty of the Federal Government, reversing their true 
relation to this Union." Pierce, of course, was expressing 
a philosophy of individualism that assumed a minor role 
for the federal government. When a presidential veto 
was sustained by a wide margin, the issue of federal 
support disappeared as a viable alternative for nearly a 
century, even though the following year Congress 
enacted legislation chat established the Governmen't 
Hospital for the Insane (later Saint Elizabeth's Hospital). 
III 
During the last third of the nineteenth century, 
the involvement of state governments in welfare and 
dependency intensified. Rapid economic and industrial 
change, geographical mobility, a growing and increas-
ingly heterogeneous population, the emergence of new 
family structures, the concentration of population in 
large urban areas, and recurring business cycles, all 
helped to undermine a welfare system designed in a 
· quite different era. The perceived crisis in public 
welfare had profound implications for the mentally iU, 
if only because public hospitals constituted the single 
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largest welfare investment by states in the nineteenth 
century. 
Beneath the rhetoric that accompanied debates 
over the proper configuration of public policy lay 
several complex and perhaps unresolvable issues. At any 
given time a certain percentage of patients admitted to 
hospitals failed to recover and thus required care for 
extended periods of time. The accumulation of chronic 
cases posed troublesome policy issues. Should states 
continue to build and maintain large and relatively 
costly centralized hospitals for the growing mentally ill 
population? Did the presence of large numbers of 
chronic patients undermine the therapeutic goals of 
hospitals? Was it appropriate to confine mentally ill 
persons in almshouses merely to save money? What level 
of government--local or state--should bear the burden of 
support? 
Persuaded that the existing system was counter-
productive and irrational, a group of social activists 
drawn from medicine and welfare began to agitate for 
an end to the division of authority between community 
and state. New York led the way with the passage of .its 
famous and influential State Care Act in I 890. This 
legislation ended dual responsibility for the mentally ilJ. 
Under its provisions all insane persons were to be cared 
for in state hospitals at state expense. Other states soon 
followed suit, and after 1900 state care became the norm 
rather than the exception. Such laws reflected the 
Progressive era tendency to expand the social welfare 
functions of state government. 
The assumption of those who favored centraliza-
tion was that community care in almshouses, although 
less expensive, was also substandard and thus perpetua-
ted chrorucity and dependency. Conversely, treatment in 
hospitals, even though more costly initially, would in the 
long run be cheaper because it would promote recovery 
and thus enable mentally ill persons to resume a produc-
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tive life. In short, the new public policy was assumed to 
be more cost effective in the long run. 
The consequences of what at that time was a 
radical innovation in public policy, however, proved to 
be quite unexpected. Most local officials were more 
than willing to surrender thefr role in providing care for 
mentally ill residents. But these same officials went 
much further than the proponents of state care had ever 
anticipated. Traditfonally, nineteenth-century alms-
houses (which were supported and administered by local 
governments) served in part as old-age homes for senile 
and aged persons. The passage of state care acts pro-
vided local officials with an unexpected opportunity; 
they began to redefJne senility in psychiatric terms and 
thus began to transfer aged persons from almshouses to 
mental hospitals. Humanitarian considerations played a 
relatively minor rote in this development; economic 
considerations were of paramount significance, for they 
fovolved a further transfer of the burden of support to 
the state. 
In the background of this shift of senile aged 
persons to mental hospitals were also demographic con-
siderations. There was a marked rise in the general 
population of those aged sixty or over. In 1860 only 4.3 
percent of tile population was sixty or over; in 1900 and 
1940 the comparable figures were 6.4 and 10.4 percent, 
respectively. In terms of absolute numbers, the change 
was even more striking. In 1860 only 1,348,000 persons 
were sixty or over, between 1900 and 1940 the number 
rose from 4,872,000 to 13,748,000. 
Faced with rapidly escalating expenditures, com-
munities were more than happy to transfer responsibility 
for their aged residents to state-supported facilities. 
Between 1880 and 1920, therefore, almshouse populations 
(for this and other reasons) declined precipitously. What 
occurred, however, was not a deinstiturionalization 
movement, but rather a lateral transfer of individuals 
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from one institution to another. In the twentieth 
century mental hospitals began to serve a surrogate old 
age homes. By 1950, for example, 40 percent of all first 
admissions to New York state mental hospitals were aged 
sixty or over. In their classic study of rates of insti-
tutionalization covering more than a century, Herbert 
Goldbamer and Andrew Marshall found that the greatest 
increase occurred in the category of sixty-year-olds and 
over. In 1885, age-specific first admission rates in 
Massachusetts for males aged sixty or over was 70.4, and 
for females 65.5 (per 100,000). By the beginning of 
World War II, the corresponding figures were 279.5 and 
223.0. 
At the same time that the proportion of aged 
patients was rising, mental hospitals were accepting large 
numbers of individuals whose behavioral peculiarities 
were related to an underlying somatic pathology. Be-
tween 1911 and I 920, for example, about 20 percent of 
all male first admissions to New York State mental 
hospitals were cases of general paresis (the comparable 
rate for females was one-third that of men). Jn genera l, 
at least one-third and probably one-half or more of the 
first admissions represented cases in which aberrant 
behavior was related to some specific somatic condition. 
High death rates among recently admitted patients 
suggest as much. 
For mental hospitals the change in the character 
of the patient population was of major significance; it 
represented a dramatic increase in chronicity and 
further shift away from therapeutic goals. The fact of 
the matter was that there were not effective therapeutic 
interventions for cerebral arteriosclerosis, paresis, 
Huntington's chorea, and other comparable conditions. 
The best that mental hospitals could offer was a better 
quality of medical and physical care for individuals who 
were incapacitated and had little prospect of recovery. 
Whether or not mental hospitals were the appropriate 
institutions for such persons was beside the point; some 
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form of care was required, irrespective of the setting in 
which it was provided. That publicly-supported institu-
tions took on this role was not surprising, given the 
absence of viable alternat ives and the high costs 
incurred in cases requiring protracted hospitalization. 
Admittedly, chronicity had always posed troub-
}jng problems for mental hospitals. Nevertheless, most 
patients in the nineteenth century were institutionalized 
for relatively short periods of time (generally three to 
nine months). Toward the close of the century this 
pattern was reversed; the proportion of short-term cases 
fell and those of long-term increased. In 1904, 27.8 
percent of the total patient population had been con-
fined for less than a year. By 1910 this total had fallen 
to 12.7 percent, although it rose to 17.4 percent in 1923. 
The greatest change came among patients institution-
alized for five years or more. In 1904, 39.2 percent of 
patients fell into this category; in 1910 and 1923 the 
respective percentages were 52.0 and 54.0 percent, 
respectively. Although data for the United States as a 
whole are unavailable after 1923, the experience-in 
Massachusetts was perhaps typical. By the 1930s nearly 
80 percent of its available mental hospital beds were 
occupied by chronic patients. 
That mental hospitals were caring for a chronic 
population was self-evident. Yet as late as 1940 the 
implications of this development were still to be felt. 
On the contrary, the framework of mental health policy 
appeared stable. By and large there was a consensus that 
care and treatment would be provided in state institu-
tions for all persons irrespective of their ability to pay 
the high costs associated with protracted hospitalization. 
1n 1941 the average daily census in state hospitals had 
reached nearly 410,000. A substantial percentage of 
each state budget was devoted to the institutional care 
of the mentally ill. Expenditures for maintenance 
amounted to about $307 per patient per year, and the 
-43-
total amount expended by all states was over $125 
million (a substantial sum by the standards of that era). 
IV 
In the postwar decades, however. the consensus on 
mental health policy virtually vanished. By the 1960s 
the legitimacy of institutional care and treatment had 
become problematic. Activists promoted a new policy 
whose goal was to provide care and treatment wi thin the 
local community rather than in the state mental hospital. 
Indeed, contemporaries often ref erred to a third or 
fourth "psychiatric revolution" equal in significance to 
the first "revolution" when Philippe Pine! b roke the 
chains of Parisian lunatics in 1793. By the 1970s 
"deinstitutionalization" had become the dominant theme. 
State mental hospitals were declining in size and impor-
tance, and--perhaps most sign if icantly--the federal 
government was playing a more and more important role 
in mental health policy. The result was a rad,ical 
transformation in the manner in which policies toward 
the mentally ill were formulated and implemented. 
What elements shaped the transformation of 
public policy in the postwar decades? The answer to 
this question is neither simple nor straightforward. A 
number of different developments converged to reshape 
public policy: a shift in psychiatric thinking and 
greater receptivity to a psychodynamic model that 
emphasized life experiences and the role of environ-
mental influences raised the possibility of using 
therapeutic interventions before the onset of any acute 
stage of severe mental illness; the movement of 
psychiatrists away from mental hospitals and into the 
community and private practice; the belief that 
psychiatry could promote prevention by contributing 
toward the amelioration of social problems that allegedly 
fostered mental diseases; the experiences of World War 
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II, which appeared to demonstrate the efficacy of com-
munity and outpatient treatment; the rise of nonmedical 
mental health occupations, which contributed to the 
growing significance of community clinics; the 
deterioration in the physical condition as well as the 
image of mental hospitals, with the consequent loss of 
faith Jo their legitimacy; and the introduction of 
psychotropic drugs that held out the promise of a more 
normal existence for patients outside of ins ti tu tions. 
Equa11y important, however, was an unforeseen 
but remarkable shift in the role of the federal govern-
ment, which became an active participant rather than a 
passive bystander. Support for new federal initiatives 
came from individuals opposed to the traditional em-
phasis on mental hospital care. To develop new policies 
in f arty-eight states seemed impract ical. Hence they 
sought to use the prestige and resources of the national 
government in an attempt to reshape mental health 
policy. Oddly enough, federal activism came at a time 
when the older nineteenth-century tensions that existed 
between local communities and state governments had 
largely diminished. In the postwar era, however,' the 
conflicts engendered by an overlapping and decentral-
ized constitutional structure were transferred to the 
national arena. Federal policy ultimately came to rest 
on the assumption that the authority and function of 
state governments in the mental health field should 
diminish and that local communities should become more 
active and prominent. The judicious use of federal 
funds would hasten the transition to a community-
oriented policy. Although policy debates were phrased 
on medical and scientific language, there js no doubt 
that the constitutional framework (which divided sover-
ejgaty and authority} shaped thefr nature in subtle but 
significant ways. 
Prior to the New Deal, the federal government 
had few responsibilities insofar as the mentally ill were 
concerned. In J 882 Congress had enacted a law forbid-
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ding the admission of insane immigrants, and enforce-
ment of this measure fell to the Public Health Service 
{PHS). In 1930 a Division of Mental Hygiene within the 
PHS was created, but it dealt only with narcotic addic-
tion problems. During the late 1930s a quiet campaign 
was launched to persuade Congress to establish a 
National Neuropsychiatric Institute within the PHS mod-
eled somewhat along the lines of the National Cancer 
Institute (established by law in 1937). This proposal 
involved federal support for research on mental illness. 
Preoccupation with war-related issues, however, pre-
cluded any congressional action at the time. 
Curiously enough, the transformation of the fed-
eral government into an active partner in the mental 
health field djd not occur because of legal or consti-
tutional changes. On the contrary, social, economic, and 
poUtical elements played a far more decisive role. The 
crisis of the 1930s had hastened the emergence of a 
welfare state ideology that had altered in fundiimental 
ways the scope of federal activities. Moreover, the role 
of scientists and intellectuals in the formulation and 
implementation of public policy had dramatically in-
creased. World War II not only confirmed but accelera-
ted these trends. Indeed, between 1941 and 1945 large 
numbers of young individuals from the social, physical, 
natural, and medical sciences were employed in federal 
agencies or the military. Their experiences, when 
super imposed on the events that occurred during the 
Depression of the J 930s, led them unerringly to the 
conclusion that national problems required national 
solutions. 
Toward the end of the war a small group revived 
the concept of a national neuropsychiatric institute 
within the federal government. Led by Robert H. Felix, 
a psychiatrist who headed the Division of Mental 
Hygiene, a small but highly organized group managed to 
persuade Congress to consider the proposal. At that time 
a broad coalition of medical and social activists was on 
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the verge of succeeding in their efforts to transform the 
role of the federal government in health pol icy by 
securing legislation (e.g .• the Hill•Burton Act of 1946) 
that would appropriate large subsidies for hospital 
construction. research, and medical education. Felix and 
others were aware of this impending change in health 
policy and were determined to ensure that the problems 
of mental illnesses not be excluded. In July, 1946, 
Congress enacted and the president signed the National 
Mental Health Act--a piece of legislat ion destined to 
reshape sharply the respective roles of the federal and 
state governments. 
The National Mental Health Act had three basic 
goals. First, to support research rela tfog to the causes, 
diagnosis, and treatment of neuropsychiatric disorders. 
Second, to train prof essional personnel in psychiatry by 
awarding individual fellowships and institutional grants, 
Finally, the act funded grants to states to assist in the 
establishment of clinics and treatment centers, and to 
underwrite demonstration studies dealing with the pre-
vention, diagnosis, and treatment of neuropsychi'atric 
disorders. Financial support for institutional care and 
treatment was specifically excluded. 
What was most significant about the National 
Mental Health Act was not its specific provisions, but 
rather its general goals and the way in which they were 
to be implemented. The measure provided financial and 
iostitutjonal support for research, much of which was 
based on the assumption that the roots of mental 
illnesses could be traced to broad social and environ-
mental determinants. Indeed, under Felix the energies 
of the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH)--
which came into formal existence in 1949 under the 
provisions of the Act--emphasized the social bases of 
mental disorder; extramural biomedical research was 
never assigned a high priority, perhaps in part because 
research into basic physiological processes relating to the 
me ntal illnesses may not have been possible in the 1940s. 
-47-
Whatever the reasons may have been, it is clear that the 
legislation promoted a social model of mental disease 
and an emphasis on community treatment rather than 
institutional care. 
The passage of the National Mental Health Act 
and the subsequent creation of the NIMH had profound 
political and policy ramifications. Before World War II 
mental health policy tended to be somewhat fragmented. 
Although the activities of certain states--notably New 
York and Massacbusetts--were closely monitored by 
others and their examples often emulated in one form or 
another, there were few opportunities to debate public 
policy issues on a national level and to avoid more local 
or regional concerns. State funding patterns tended to 
follow traditional patterns and were generally concen-
trated on the support of mental hospital systems. 
Nevertheless, decentralization also promoted a certain 
degree of diversity. Wisconsin, for example, developed a 
unique system of county facilities that provided care for 
chronic patients. Its state hospitals, therefore, rarely 
retained patients for prolonged periods. 
The establishment of NIMH, however, introduced 
a completely new element, for its officials had the 
capacity to speak to a national constituency that 
transcended the narrower interests of individual states. 
As the federal agency most directly involved with 
mental health, NIMH could frame a national agenda. It 
could also employ its rapidly increasing fiscal resources 
to promote the kind of policy innovations that its 
officials desired. Its identity as a medical and prof es-
s.ional agency only enhanced the authority and legiti-
macy of its staff Moreover, close ties with congres-
sional leaders of both parties gave NIMH officials an 
opportunity to provide the data that would ultimately 
reshape mental health policies. ln short, the very 
existence of NIMH gave individuals both within and 
without the federal government an instjtutional base to 
promote innovation. The new federal role ultimately 
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had a dramatic impact on the mental health policies of 
state government. 
The views of Robert H. Felix, who directed 
NIMH from its founding until 1964, were suggestive of 
the shape that mental health ideology and policy would 
take in the postwar decades. In his eyes mental dis-
orders constituted "a true public health problem," the 
resolution of which required three things: more know-
ledge about the etiology and nature of mental diseases; 
more effective methods of prevention and treatment of 
mental illnesses; and better trained staff. Although 
reluctantly conceding that the mental hospital would be 
required for the immediate future, Felix insisted that 
the greatest need for a large number of outpatient 
community clinics (probably modeled after prewar child 
guidance clinics as well as World War JI battalion aid 
stations that provided emergency psychiatric treatment) 
to serve individuals in the early stages of any mental 
disease. Not only would these clinics avoid the stigma-
tization associated with mental hospitals, but they would 
pave the way for effective preventive programs~ 
Within a year after the passage of the National 
Mental Health Act, Felix was exploring the possibility of 
short-term training courses for physicians and other 
workers to organize and staff the community mental 
health program. "The guiding philosophy which per-
meates the activities of the National Institute of Mental 
Health," he told his American Psychiatric Association 
colleagues in 1949, "is that prevention of mental illness, 
and the production of positive mental health, is an 
attainable goal." rn effect, Felix was implicitly suggest-
ing that the psychodynamic model of mental illnesses 
was appropriate for the formulation of public policy. 
Although a considerable part of the extramural 
research sponsored by NIMH in its early years dealt with 
etiology and treatment, it is noteworthy that much of 
this research was conducted by social scientists. Such a 
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funding pattern, of course, reinforced and underscored 
the view that social determinants played a far more 
important role in etiology, and that community rather 
than hospital treatment, represented the most desirable 
public policy choice. 
With the support of NIMH's Community Services 
Branch, which provided matching federal funds, com-
munity mental health programs expanded rapidly. 
Before 1940 community clinics existed largely to serve 
the needs of children and delinquents; after 1945 their 
clientele began to include the general adult population. 
Although mental hospitals continued to absorb the lion's 
share of state mental health budgets, the assumption was 
that an alternative community program based on preven-
tion and early treatment would eventually diminish or 
eliminate the need for hospitalization. The community 
mental health program, by identifying mental illnesses 
in their early stages, would prepare the groundwork for 
treatmen.t either in community clinics or in psychiatric 
wards of general hospitals. During the 1950s the number 
of community clinics increased rapidly. NIMFI was 
extraordinarily successfu l in creating a constituency 
composed of professional personnel employed at these 
clinics that could be mobilized at critical moments. 
Admittedly, federal officials were not alone in support-
ing a community-oriented program. Indeed, the Council 
of State Governments as well as the Governors' Confer-
ences in the 1950s strongly endorsed this new approach 
which held out hope of arresting the ever-rising mental 
hospital population. Moreover, private foundations such 
as the Milbank Memoriat Fund and many university-
affiliated departments of psychiatry (which were headed 
by psychodynamic psychiatrists) added to the chorus of 
approval. The role of NIMH in conferring legitimacy on 
a noninstitutional approach, nevertheless, must not be 
minimfaed. 
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V 
By the 1950s proponents of change were arguing 
that the time was ripe for another public policy shift 
that would transfer part of the burdens posed by mental 
illnesses from the states to the federal government while 
at the same time developing new initiatives that might 
reduce the costs of institutional care. The passage of the 
National Mental Health Act was only a beginning; what 
was required was legislation that provided for direct 
federal subsidies for mental health services. That a bio-
medical lobby was now in existence and flourishing sug-
gested that such new policy initiatives would receive a 
sympathetic hearing in Congress. Equally significant, a 
national campaign could employ the media to bring a 
message of hope to an eager and enthusiastic public 
trustful of the claims of mental health experts from the 
medical profession as well as from the social sciences. 
The growing significance of social science in the 
postwar era undoubtedly added legitimacy to the clamor 
for change. Finally, the introduction of neurole'ptic 
drugs in the 1950s helped to create an expectation that 
severely mentally HI persons could be treated outside of 
traditional institutions.1 
To expand the role of the federal government in 
mental health required some strategic planning. Dr. 
Kenneth Appel, then president of the American Psy-
chiatric Association, proposed at the APA's Mental 
Hospital Institute in 1953 that "a sociological study of 
the breakdown crisis in the administration of state 
mental hospital functions" be undertaken. His model 
was the famous Flexner Report of 1910, which allegedly 
had transformed medical education. Within two years a 
Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health (JCMIH) 
had been established. With bipartisan support in 
Congress, a Mental Health Study Act was passed in mid-
1955 endorsing the work of the commission and author-
izing the PHS to provide grants. The stage was now set 
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for a comprehensive long study of the problems posed by 
mental illnesses as well as possible solutions. 
After nearly six years of work and an 
expenditure of $3 million, the JCMIH issued its well-
known final report, Action for Mental Health. The 
analysis and recommendations in the report were broad 
rather than technical or narrow, and in many respects 
mirrored much of the thinking of the postwar years. 
The document embodied a psychosocial and psycho-
dynamic approach, and stressed the necessity for 
environmental approaches to the problems of mental 
health within an integrated community setting. It 
argued for a diversified program: a much larger 
investment in basic research; a partnership between 
psychiatry and oonmedical mental health workers (but 
wjth due attention paid to their respective competen-
cies); a national recruitment and training program for 
those involved in providing services; a greater effort to 
make services available to "mentally troubled 
individuals" to forestall more serious breakdowns; 
intensive treatment of the acute mentally ill ip com-
munity clinics, general hospitals, and mental hospitals; 
provisions for aftercare, intermediate care, and rehabili-
tation services for released patients; and a bold attempt 
to educate the American public to recognize mental 
illnesses and to support a national program. The report 
further demanded that no state hospitals of more than 
J,000 beds be built; that no patients be admitted to any 
existing facility having more than a thousand beds; and 
that all state hospitals be converted "into centers for the 
long-term and combined care of chronic diseases, includ-
ing mental illness." Its fiscal recommendatfons were 
equally striking; members asked that expenditures for 
public mental patient services be doubled in the next 
five years and tripled in the next ten, and urged an 
expansion in the fiscal role of the federal government 
well beyond a commitment to research and training. 
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Ac1io11 for Memal Health was a broad document 
that spelled out a vision for the future rather than a 
specific legislative program. Its inclusiveness and even 
vague language offered something to a ll constituencies, 
includjog proponents of institutional as well a com-
munity care. For state government officials the prospect 
of federal funding was welcome, given the sharp escala-
tions of expenditures for mental health. Between 1945 
and 1960 the average per capita expenditure for the 
maintenance of patients in state menta l hospitals had 
risen from $386 to $1,679, and the total expenditures of 
state institutions went from nea rly $175 million to $917 
milJion. 
A vision, however, differs from a specific legisla-
tive program. Those concerned with the mentally ill, 
therefore, were faced with the difficult task of drawing 
up some kind of legislative agenda capable of attracting 
broad support within and outside the Congress. Al-
though there were disagreements about the precise form 
of such an agenda, they seemed minor alongside the 
existing consensus that some kind of action was ' 
required. 
That those committed to new policies turned to 
the federal government was not surprising. During the 
1960s social activists manifested little confidence in 
state policy making; they had far greater faith in the 
ability of the federa l government to develop new priori-
ties and programs and to provide adequate levels of 
funding, Their views were by no means idiosyncratic; 
the prevailing consensus of that decade was that states 
had failed to meet their social welfare responsibilities. 
Hence many activists, even though paying homage to the 
concept of a federal-state partnership, promoted policies 
that tended to diminish the role and authority of state 
governments and to forge direct relationships between 
the federal government and local communities. 
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Critics of state social policy making received 
fodirect support from NIMH. Most of the key personnel 
within this agency identified state governments with 
what they perceived as an obsolete preoccupation with 
institutional care, and were support ive of policy 
initiatives that focused on community services and alter-
natives to mental hospital care. Curiously enough, these 
critics were seemingly unaware of any consequences that 
might follow a diminution in state involvement in 
mental health policies. The position paper prepared by 
NIMH's Task Force on Action for Mental Health was 
illustrative. Whereas the JCMJH had emphasized the 
care of the mentally ill, NIMH preferred instead a policy 
that focused on "the improvement of the mental health 
of the people of the country through a continuum of 
services, not just upon the treatment and rehabilitative 
aspects of these programs." The document virtually 
ignored any consequences that might follow a shift in 
the locus of political authority. 
The el_ection of John F. Kennedy in 1960 augured 
well for the hopes of those dedicated to an expanded 
role in mental health poHcy. Kennedy seemed sympa-
thetic, though his basic concern was with mental retar-
dation rather than mental illnesses as such. By the end 
of 1961 a presidential interagency committee chaired by 
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), 
Abraham A. Ribicoff, had been created to develop a 
coherent program. 
From the very outset, it was clear that the pro-
ponents of a community-oriented program had the upper 
hand. Felix (and other like-minded individuals in key 
positions) played a decisive role in the new developments 
that followed. Felix's position as dfrector of NIMH 
enabled him both to set the agenda and to control the 
flow of information that served as the basis for policy 
discussions. His NlMH Task Force prepared recom-
mendations for a community-based mental health 
program for the presidential interagency committee. Its 
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recommendations made the community mental health 
center the primary recipient of federal funds, and 
specifically opposed any program that emphasized 
institutional care. Indeed, NIMH made the assumption 
that a comprehensive community menta l health program 
would lead to the disappearance of mental hospitals 
within a quarter of a century. 
Significantly, the presidential interagency 
committee accepted the recommendations of NIMH, and 
forwarded them to HEW. Within HEW there were a 
variety of competing views. Eventually, however, the 
department rejected the agenda of the JCMIH, which 
was directed, in part, toward strengthening state systems. 
HEW, and subsequently President Kennedy, in effect, 
endorsed the rhetoric of community treatment and 
supported the creation of new centers whose relationship 
to traditional mental hospital populations was amor-
phous. In his message to Congress in February, 1963, 
Kennedy proposed a new and radical national mental 
health program. "This approach," be stated, "relies 
primarily upon the new knowledge and new dr:ugs 
acquired and developed in recent years which make it 
possible for most of the mentally ill to be successfully 
and quickly treated in their own communities and 
returned to a useful place in society." Such "break-
throughs," he added, "have rendered obsolete ... prolonged 
or permanent confinement in huge, unhappy mental 
hospitals." The focus of the new policy was destined to 
be the community mental health center. Those with 
access to the inner councils of the WhHe House and HEW 
were cognizant of the fact that Kennedy's message was 
more a rejection than a endorsement of the 
recommendations of the JCMIH. 
That the initiative of the Kennedy Administra-
tion departed in some fundamental ways from the 
recommendations of the JCMIH was either overlooked or 
ignored. Indeed, Kennedy urged the establishment of 
centers; the JCMIH had spoken about clinics. The 
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differences between the two terms at the time did not 
appear to be important, but it is clear that the former 
was far more inclusive and presumed not the strengthen-
jng of an existing policy but rather the creation of a 
new policy. Indeed, the designation of the new entities 
as "centers" evoked an image of a physical structure, but 
did not include any discussion of its functions or its 
relationship to mental hospitals. Jn Congress rhetoric 
rather than reality carried the day. The rejection of the 
traditional policy of institutional care and treatment and 
its replacement by a new departure was formally con-
firmed when the act became law in October I 963. The 
act provided $150 million to fund the construction of 
community mental health centers for a three-yea r period, 
and required states to submit comprehensive plans for 
implementing the provisions of the new law. 
Thus by the early 1960s the foundations of the 
longstanding tradition of institutional care had been 
undermined. Indeed, hospital populations declined 
rapidly after 1965. A shift in thinking had made 
community care and treatment, at least in theory, an 
acceptable alternative to institutionalization. Adminis-
trative and structural changes within institutions, 
including open door policies, informal admissions, and 
efforts to prepare patients for early release, as well as 
the introduction of psychotropic drugs, reinforced the 
belief that treatment could be provided in the com-
munity. One of the most significant factors in the 
decline of hospital populations resulted from the passage 
of Medicaid and Medicare. This legislation stimulated 
the growth of chronic nursing homes, and many aged 
persons formerly cared for in mental hospitals were sent 
to them. Such a development was welcomed by state 
officials, since aged persons cared for at state expense in 
state mental hospitals were now transferred to nursing 
homes, thus facilitating the transfer of man y costs to the 
national government. 
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The enthusiasm of the 1960s, however, could not 
conceal the fact that a coherent policy had yet to be 
defined. The reduction of the patient population 
undoubtedly improved the Jives of those remaining in 
state hospitals. Nevertheless, the consequences of 
postwar innovations in mental health policy were hardly 
an unmixed blessing. The federal initiative, oddly 
enough, diminished the role and authority of states by 
forging a de facto policy that made the community 
mental health center--not the state hospital--the major 
component of the mental health system. Indeed, the act 
of 1963 virtually bypassed the states, and hence gave 
community mental health centers relative immunity 
from state supervision. The new program, as a number 
of state commissioners of mental health pointed out in 
1966, was "overly rigid and inflexible, with emphasis on 
a single national pattern." There was no effort to define 
the basic function of centers or to develop mechanisms 
to ensure some measure of integration with a state 
hospital system that--whatever its shortcomings--
traditionally had provided minimum levels of care for 
the mentally ill. 
In ensuing years mentally ill persons previously 
cared for in mental hospitals were thrust into communi-
ties that were unable or unwilling to provide comprehen-
sive care. Community mental hea,lth centers, ostensibly 
established as alternatives to mental hospitals, had, by 
the 1970s, been fransf ormed into social service agencies 
offering counselling and intervention for problems of 
Hving. Whatever their role and function, it was evident 
that they had little or no contact with the severely 
mentally ill. Ironically, in an era when resources for 
mental health were growing rapidly and psychiatric and 
psychological services were expanding to include new 
categories of individuals, the needs of the severely 
menta lly ill were sometimes ignored as other priorities 
took precedence. 
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VI 
From a constitutional point of view the history of 
mental health policy offers fascinating insights into the 
workings of a system of government that divides sover-
eignty and ·authority. The fact of the matte r is that the 
American federal system offers rewards (as well as 
penalties), and thus shapes public policies in unforeseen 
and indirect ways. During the nineteenth century, state 
and local governments often came into conflict over the 
issue of where mentally ill persons would receive care 
and treatment. As long as fiscal responsibility remained 
divided, communities attempted to minimize their expen-
ditures by retaining mentally ill persons in almshouses, 
where costs were below those at state institutions. When 
states ultimately responded by assuming the total 
burden, communities not only reduced their a lmshouse 
populations, but redefined senility in psychiatric terms 
and transferred aged persons to state hospitals. 
I 
After World War II the arena of conflict shifted 
as proponents of change, dissatisfied with state policy 
making, turned to the federal government. Initially, 
states tended to support new federal initiatives in the 
hope of reducing their own fiscal responsibilities. By 
the 1960s, however, new federal policies had begun to 
bypass state agencies and operate directly on local 
communities. The erosion of state authority, however, 
had dramatic consequences; there were few constraints 
on community mental h~alth centers, many of which 
were unconcerned with the broad needs of the severely 
mentally ill. Authority and policy tended to become 
fragmented and diffused during the 1970s and 1980s, to 
the detrime.nt of the severely mentally ill. Once again, a 
federal political structure had affected public policy. 
Debates involving mental health poLicies have, 
understandably, focused on substance and often ignored 
the American constitutional framework of government. 
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Yet structure is a significant component. To so argue is 
not to imply that the framework of government should 
be radically altered; all government structures, after all, 
have consequences for policy. It is only to suggest that 
those who emphasize substance and ignore structure, at 
least in the American context, may unknowingly pro-
mote unpredictable consequences that are not always to 
their liking. 
-
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NOTE 
1. The impact of neuroleptic drugs in reducing 
hospital populations has been greatly exaggerated. 
For the nation as a whole, the pace of deinstitu-
tionalization in the decade following 1955 was 
modest; the average annual decline in hospital 
populations was only L5 percent. The greatest 
decHne occun-ed after 1965. Indeed, drugs had a 
greater effect on attitudes and hospital practices 
than it did on psychiatric symptoms. In many 
institutions drugs created a sense of therapeutic 
optimism that hastened desireable internal 
changes. It is also clear that the psychiatric 
perception of the efficacy of drug therapy was 
more realistic than public expectations, which 
were often shaped by the exaggerated claims 
found in the mass media. 
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WOMEN, CHILDREN 
AND "THE GENERAL WELFARE" 
by Lela B. Costin 
In this bicentennial year of the signing of the 
Constit ution, it must be remembered that the now 
famous document designed to protect individual Hberties 
did not acknowledge rights for women and children. 
The subordinate position of women was firmly embed-
ded in the patriarchal culture of the founding fathers; 
revolutionary vision did not extend so far as to alter 
women's status by granting equal rights in the new 
republic. 
Only belatedly and cautiously, beginning in the 
nineteenth century, did the elected lawmakers use 
powers which the Constitution had reserved to the 
states--powers that enabled them, state by state, to 
provide a measure of rights and protection for women 
and children. The tenacity of patriarchal thinking a nd 
the resistance to women's participation in the gover-
nance of the nation are attested to by the long struggle 
for the right of women to vote. This basic r ight of 
citizenship was obtained by constitutional amendment in 
1920, well after more than a century of women's struggle 
for justice. 
Given the initial silence of the Constitution on 
the rights of women and children, it is appropriate to 
ask how they have fared through the two hundred years 
of its existence. A partial answer can be found by 
examining the roles that were assigned to women in the 
new repub lic; the origins of patriarchy and its basic 
belief that biology is the ultimate determinant of 
women's social a nd occupational roles; the tight link that 
has been assigned to the interests of women and chil-
dren; the inherent conflict between the award of protec-
tion and rights; and ways in which these conflicts and 
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beliefs have been played out in legislative halls, the 
courts, and the workplace. 
WOMEN IN THE ERA OF REVOLUTION 
Certain general assumptions prevailed, brought 
over by the European settlers to the new world: that 
women were subordinate to and dependent upon family 
members--fathers, husbands, brothers--and that women's 
activities were appropriately in the context of the 
household, to the exclusion of a role in the political 
community. Nevertheless, for the first several genera-
tions of colonial settlement jn the seventeenth century, 
men and women, to some degree, were on equal terms. 
This equality was not conferred upon women but made 
necessary by the hardships of daily life. In colonial 
times, "the exigencies of surviving in the wilderness 
placed a premium on woman's participation in produc-
tion, accorded her a central position in economic !if e, 
and discouraged any refined notions about her distinc-
tive or feminine temperament." In the small villages 
where the colonial population was concentrated, women 
found entrances to political affairs. Politics was played 
out largely within familiar settings such as circles of 
families or town meetings where women had a chance to 
effectively exert influence.1 
Yet when the revolution came, no formal political 
means existed by which women could be consulted or 
express their views. They were relied upon, however, 
for essential war-time tasks--the household manufacture 
of cloth, sewing blankets for the troops, providing a 
civilian source of food and shelter for soldiers, a 
contributor of funds, an organizer of boycotts of British 
goods, a spy. During long and lonely absences of men 
who were fighting in the War of Independence or away 
attending to the business of forging a new government, 
women not only cared for their children and gave help 
to other connected famjlies and neighbors; they also 
applied their mental and physical energies to the formid-
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able task of managing and conserving the economic base 
of an entire household, often with considerable financial 
acumen. Some were defiant women who believed that 
women should share in the fruits of the revolution--
individual liberties. Abigail Adams was one who didn•t 
hesitate to warn her husband wjth the declaration: "If 
particular care and attention is not paid to the ladies, 
we are determined to foment a rebellion, and will not 
hold ourselves bound by any laws in which we have no 
voice or representation.112 
That women thought about their place in the new 
republic is attested to by their letters and diaries, peti-
tions to legislatures, court records, pamphlets and books. 
From her study of these sources, Linda Kerber conclud-
ed that for many women the revolution was a strongly 
politicizing experience, even though "the newly created 
republic made little room for them as political beings.113 
In fact, the new government under the constitution 
moved women further back from the sources of power, 
which became more centralized and exercised in a 
remote public sphere inaccessible to women. 
Other factors were at work to restrict women's 
roles. The colonial pattern of farming for single family 
subsistence with its simple and interdependent division 
of tabor between the sexes was in decline. The rising 
industrial economy reduced the perceived worth of work 
carried out in the home. Women's full time responsi-
bilities for family maintenance became a generally 
unacknowledged economic product. These factors, along 
with the constitutional exclusion of women from signifi-
cant roles in the _political arena, left the sex-gender 
system in "a1orphous disarray" with no clear emblem of 
womanhood. 
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A PROPER ROLE FOR WOMEN IN THE NEW 
REPUBLIC 
In consequence, men and women both found it 
imperative to define an acceptable role for women, one 
that could be generally recognized as a great service to 
the republic. Kerber defined it thus: "They found what 
they were seeking in the notion of what might be called 
'Republican Motherhood.' The Republican Mother inte-
grated political values into her domestic life. Dedicated 
as she was to the nurture of public-spirited male citizens 
she guaranteed the steady infusion of virtue into the 
republic ... The woman now claimed a signjficant politi-
cal role, though she played it in the home. This new 
identity had the advantage of appearing to reconcile 
politics and domesticity ... But the role remained a 
severely limited one; it had no collective definition, 
provided no outlet for women to affect a real political 
decision." Mothers of the republic were still on its edges, 
in a separate ~rivate sphere, segregated from the public 
arena of men. 
Within her domain, however, the role of woman 
was becoming enhanced and valued in a new way. · 
Around the turn of the eighteenth century and into the 
nineteenth century, beliefs and popular attitudes toward 
children began to change substantially. Childhood as a 
major theme appeared in the writings of Jean Jacques 
Rousseau, Johann Henrich Pestalozzi, Wil1iam Blake, and 
others and was disseminated into America. The strict 
CaJvinist notion of children's innate ev il tendencies 
which must be corrected gave way to a new conception 
of children--their essential innocence, their naturalness 
and individuality, the necessity to cherish them and to 
rear them responsibly, and a new acknowledgement of 
the value of the chi Id. Romantic and often sentimen-
talized views of the child became common. 
The principal emphasis drawn from the nurture 
writers, as Bernard Wishy concluded in his study of the 
child and the republic, was for mothers to now accept 
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"new and portentous responsibilities." The moral 
superiority and moral guardianship of women were per-
vasive themes of the "separate spheres" ideology. The 
American mother was now expected to take the lead in 
most matters connected with the child. The reason for 
this new award of authority to women, as Wishy stated 
it, "was simple enough: the mother was the obvious 
source of everything that would save or damn the child; 
the historical and spiritual destiny of America lay in her 
hands ... the 'new mother's' place was in the home as the 
most powerful figure in affecting American society. 
What were 'women's rights' compared with such 
influence?116 
Regardless of the extent to which woman's role as 
mother was elevated to a higher level of esteem, the new 
tide of domestic reform placed her under stern pressure 
to meet society's sex-role expectations. Doing so, how-
ever, reinforced traditional attitudes toward women and 
the public perception of the interests of women and 
children as synonymous. And significan tly, the new 
authority given to woman as mother was expendable 
only in her separate sphere. 
This separate sphere could only have been main-
tained wjth the cooperation of women. That leaves 
certain questions. Why did women who had played vital 
roles in the revolution accept this unequal status? Why 
did they not "foment a rebellion" as Abigail Adams had 
forecast? When did the fate of women and children 
become so tightly linked? When and how in the history 
of human development did female subordination come 
into existence? Gerda Lerner's study of the creation of 
patriarchy sheds some light on these questions.7 
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THE ORIGINS OF PATRIARCHY 
Lerner began her analysis with the basic assump-
tion that men and women built civiljzation jointly. 
Together they struggled up from their helpless 
dependence on nature. Patriarchy was not the result of 
one event but a process of over nearly 2,500 years. 
Lerner places the first sexual division of labor in 
societies where men carried out the big-game hunting, 
and women and chHdren the food-gathering, both 
production for subsistence. She acknowledges that this 
division of labor derived from biologica l sex differences. 
But these differences were not .of strength and endur-
ance of men and women, but were reproductive differ-
ences, specifically woman's ability to bear children and 
of necessity to nourish them from her breasts. A woman 
may have been strong enough to hunt big game, but with 
a baby in her arms or on her back or hip, big-game 
bunting was not practica l. Mothers who supplied from 
their own bodies the only source of nourishment for 
infants held an awesome power over their lives and 
carried a heavy responsibility in a harsh environment t,o 
protect and nurture the children who survived:, Helpless 
infancy fostered a strong mother-child bond. That 
women performed tasks compatible with child-bearing 
and child-rearing was a biological necessity. In turn, 
men who left for long hunting trips needed women's 
cooperative effort in food gathering and child care. It 
was an interdependent division of labor essen tial to the 
group's survival and acceptable to both men and women. 
The development of grain agriculture, however, 
jntroduced factors that weakened the generally equal 
distribution of roles and led to new levels of male 
domjnance. Agriculture was a labor intensive system. It 
required the work of all group members and group con-
tinuity over seasons. The work of children became a 
newly significant economic asset. Reproducing children 
was more than ever needed, and heightened the need to 
acquire more women as reproducers. Lerner maintains 
that women, and their reproductive product-children--
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became the first appropriated property captured in 
tribal wars or sold for the new accumulation of private 
property. The creation of private property and the 
securing of property into the hands of men was a major 
force in the expansion of male dominance. Thus Lerner 
concludes that male dominance is a historical phenom-
enon that arose out of a biologically-determining 
situation. Over time it became a culturally created and 
enforced structure. This does not imply that later 
"separate spheres" and division of labor based on 
women's mothering are "natural." Sexual attributes are 
biological; gender is a product of historical process. 
Lerner sharply distinguishes between the biological 
necessity to which men and women in the earliest states 
of human development adapted, and the culturally 
created customs and institutions which, over time, 
became deeply entrenched gender constructs. Biological 
determinism became a prescrlption for women's roles, 
and remains so--a poHtical defense of the status quo and 
a subordinate sex. 
EQUALITY IN MARRIAGE 
Although the post-revolutionary era in America 
clearly circumscribed women's authority and power, 
their times were different from those of colonial women. 
Strong women who had contributed to the War of 
Independence and their daughters did not consider 
themselves to be victims bound together in static 
submission. Woman's "separate spheres" was after all a 
way of thinking, not a formally sanctioned structure. A 
spirit of freedom, better education for women in the 
nineteenth century, and the efforts of women's rights 
groups forecast new demands by women to change their 
unequal status. 
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Marital Unitv and Women's Property 
Improvement in marriage laws was a first target 
for reform. Given the nature of the Constitution, this 
effort began at the state level. Aided by principles of 
the revolution that had emphasized freedom from 
oppressive masters, divorce laws became generally more 
accessible to women in a number of states. However, the 
egalitarian ideology stemming from the revo lution did 
not extend to dismantling the practice of coverture, that 
is, the husband's legal right to take control of his wife's 
property, manage it, and act independently with respect 
to lt. Whhout economic power derived from ownership 
and management of property, a married woman had no 
independent claim to a political identity of her own. 
Indeed, she was herself "property." Marriage property 
laws were part of America's legal heritage from English 
common law and harked back to Blackstone's concept of 
"marital unity," a concept that rested upon beliefs in 
biological determinants of women's capabilities, their 
consequent disabilities, and their need for protection 
under the common law. As Blackstone stated it, "Even 
the disabilities, which the wife Hes under, are 'for the 
most part intended for her protection and benefit, so 
great a favorite is the female sex for the laws of 
England.118 Early feminist Sophonisba Breckinridge 
llked to give an ironic paraphrase of the legal principle 
of marital unity thus: When the twain became one, the 
husband was surely that one.9 
The concept of marital unity did not originate 
with Blackstone in England. From her study of 
marriage property laws, Norma Basch characterized 
marital unity as "an ancient metaphor for marriage," one 
that had functioned in a variety of historical contexts. 
Over time, the husband's right to control his wife's 
property "provided a convenient way of thfoking about 
women as eternally subordinate," which in the face of 
challenge tended to leave coverture intact. True, some 
exceptions to coverture were recognized, ones which 
assertive women could sometimes utilize effectively m 
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courts of equity. But most women did not fall into 
special categories addressed in equity, or were not 
wealthy enough or lega lly sophisticated, and continued 
subject to the disabilities and inequalities of being 
denied the right to own and manage their own 
property. IO 
Because statutes that gave women any degree of 
property rights re-allocated power within marriage, they 
were perceived by many as a threat to the patriarchal 
organization of the family. Consequently, reform of 
laws with respect to women's property moved at a very 
slow pace. Not until the middle of the nineteenth 
century could it be termed a trend. By J 865 some 
correction had been enacted in twenty-nine states, 
statutes that were often incomplete or inconsistent. 11 
Various aspects of inequalities with respect to property 
rights for women conti~ued well into the f irst half of 
the twentieth century.1 Nevertheless, the gains in 
women's property rights "constituted a bridge between 
spheres, a link between the private space of home and 
family and the public space of politics and the 
marketplace," a significant step toward demands for 
suffrage. 13 
Guardianship of Children 
Not addressed in reform of women's property 
rights was another manifestation of the traditional view 
that women's "disabilities/ biologically determined, left 
them without intellectual and economic capacity to act 
without male support. This additional inequality before 
the law, sharply felt by women, denied them guardian-
ship and custody rights to their children. Prior to 
reform, the father had sole rights to control and custody 
of his children. During his lifetime he could place his 
children under the care of someone other than their 
mother and could do the same by will upon his death. 
By the nineteenth century, however, old prejudices had 
begun to falter. Women took advantage of the 
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prevailing romantic view of mothers and children. 
Emphasizing qualities that had been accorded them--
moral superiority and the role of moral guardianship 
within the family, they claimed "motherhood" as justi-
fication for change in their legal relationship to their 
child ren. In the period 1859 to 1874 in most states, 
women were granted joint rights with the father in 
guardianship of their children.14 
Reform in guardianship status was more reluc-
tantly accepted than were changes in property rights. 
Men had not been without self-interest in granting 
women control over their own property, For example in 
instances where a daughter's or sister's legacy was at 
risk of depletion by a spendthrift husband, economic 
interest supplanted ideology. However, attaching legal 
rights to motherhood forecast more portentous changes 
in family life and domestic governance. 
THE RISE AND PERSISTENCE OF JUDICIAL 
PATRIARCHY 
Post-revolutionary America experienced· a signifi-
cant expansion of judicial power. From a study of this 
era, Marylyn Salmon concluded that "the legal profession 
clung with tenacity to its role as protector of women"15 
rather than the guarantor of equal rights. Michael 
Grossberg ideo tified what he termed the rise of a 
judicial patriarchy, reinforced by popular opposition to 
women's rights. By the late nineteenth century, he 
claims, "a distinctive American law of custody and 
guardianship had come to rest on the twin pillars of 
gender beliefs and judicial patriarchy." Instead of 
granting powers of guardianship and custody directly 
and independently to mothers, the courts shifted the 
locus of patriarchy by usurping the role formerly held 
by fathers. The judiciary now claimed authority to 
determine which parent would be granted custody. 
Judicial patriarchy, Grossberg holds, is the most accurate 
label for the child placement powers that emerged fo the 
nineteenth century. Based on the doctrine parens patriae, 
a new standard of child welfare arose, one that con-
sidered the child's best interests by determining fault 
and applying gender-based social values. By introducing 
the standard of parental fitness, the courts fostered in 
adversarial relationship between family and courts. 1 
Gender and Class Bias 
Gender-oriented legal practices such as maternal 
custody preferences or the "tender-age" conception, 
appeared to favor women's rights to custody. However, 
this was true only if the mother conformed to the 
judge's ideal of womanhood, thus institutionalizing 
gender ideology. Gender bias was evident, for example, 
in the attitudes of the court to widows, who were 
considered to be little qualified to claim legal rights 
and, more than other women, were perceived as objects 
of pity, in need of pro1ection, and at risk of requiring community resources.1 Class biases were added to 
gender biases, putting poor and immigrant mothers and 
children at even higher risk of unjustified legaJ inter-
vention and control. 
Gender and class biases persist today in the inter-
actions of the judicial system and the child welfare 
system, specifically in the way girls are treated in the 
law enforcement structure. In contrast to boys, girls are 
more likely to be ref erred to court, and for less serious 
offenses. They are routinely referred for sexual mis-
behavior, are at greater risk of detention, and more 
likely to be institutionalized than entered into com-
munity programs. Once institutionalized, girls are 
afforded f ewer services and learning opportunities than 
are boys.18 These differences in treatment by sex have 
been explained as necessary for girls' protection. In 
fact , they are long-practiced mechanisms of control that 
maintain and reinforce expectations of traditional sex 
roles and ma le dominance. 
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The experience of poor and minority children 
and youth provides another example of gender and class 
bias in the judicial and child welfare systems of the 
states. These children are at highest risk of being 
screened into the juvenile justice system, placed in an 
institution and kept there for longer periods of time. In 
addition , their mothers, in an effor t to secure needed 
community services and financial resources, are inevita-
bly subject to the scrutiny of society's agents and 
evaluatjon of theh maternal fitness. 
Child Abuse and Expansion of 
the Judicial Patriarchy· 
Contemporary public concern about child abuse, 
and the passage of mandatory reporting laws has had an 
unintended consequence--a twentieth century expansion 
of social control powers and the comingling of the 
judicial and child welfare systems. It is far from 
certain that escalated reporting rates represent a true 
increase in the incidence of child abuse. National 
statistics for the year 1985 tell us that out of 1~928,000 
reported c11ses, upon investigation 43 percent were 
foundect. 19 It is entirely proper and just that these 
maltreated children benefit from society's concern and 
protection. It is also of concern that an unknown num-
ber of cases of abuse go unreported, especially among 
middle- and upper-income families. However, another 
disquieting question remains with respect to more than 
half of the cases where abuse is reported, but upon 
investigation is not confirmed. What residue of exacer-
bated tensions, anger, and heightened parental insecurity 
follows involuntary societal intervention into family 
life? Such an intrusion, however well meant, raises the 
spector of society's heavy disapproval and the risk of 
losing one's children. Many of these unsupported allega-
tions are directed towards poor women, or parents whose 
cultural patterns are neither understood or accepted, as 
welJ as others who lack support from relatives or friends 
and are marginal in child care. Basic social services, 
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voluntarily offered and used, in many such instances 
could improve child care and reinforce family auton-
omy. However, such services are not generally available. 
The gap between the number of child abuse cases 
reported and the lack of prompt and intensive services 
offered reflects conditions not easily modified. Signifi-
cantly, increasing numbers of reports leave child protec-
tion workers bard pressed to do more than process 
reports. In addition, most agencies have not developed 
explicit and reliable criteria for making decisions as to 
which families can safely care for their children. 
Troubling confusion as to the nature of an effective 
division of responsibilities between the court and the 
protective agency results in the too hasty removal of 
children from home into foster care, or the unjustified 
return of children to abusive parents. 
Despite the considerable literature reflecting 
systematic study of child abuse, it remains a complex, 
multi-dimensional and only partially understood phe-
nomenon. How to protect children without encroaching 
upon parental rights is far from clear. 
RIGHTS AND PROTECTION 
The concept of legal rights for children is a more 
nebulous one than rights for women. An u nderstanding 
of children's rights has been obscured by confusion 
about the meaning of. the term. "In its practical applica-
tion 'children's rights' has traditionally meant a claim to 
special protections under the law, rather tha~ to more 
broadly construed civil or political liberties." O And 
indeed, children by all counts are dependent on adults, 
immature in some aspects even as they grow and learn, 
needing guidance and supervision, needing protection. A 
long-standing belief in this society is that protection of 
children should come from parents, a belief that remains 
at the center of debate about rights for children. 
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The idea of rights for children, in contrast to 
protection, has been slow to develop. In 1852, in an 
article entitled "The Rights of Children" appeared in a 
New England periodical, but the appeal was chiefly for 
protection of children against parental "tyranny," rather 
than for child r ights independent of parents.21 Eldridge 
Gerry, the late nineteenth leader of the New York 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, in 
I 882 couched the in tent of his organization in the lan-
guage of rights for children by emphasizing the axiom 
that "at the present day in this country, children have 
some rights which even parents are bound to respect.1122 
In fact, the anti-crue lt y movement which he led relied 
primarily upon coercive reform aimed chiefly at lower 
class immigrant parents. The remedy for alleged cruelty 
was stern punishment of the offending parents and pro-
tection of their children by confine,ment in an institu-
tion, usuaJJy for the rest of their growing up years, a 
poignant illustration of the injustice of ill-placed 
prog·rams of protection upon "different" social classes of 
children and parents. 
Legal Recognition of Child Rights 
The matter of child rights was long delayed. 
Beginning in the decade of the 1960s, the courts began 
to address the question of rights for minors independent 
of their parents. Examples of the issues that have 
reached the Supreme Court and been ruled upon are the 
rights of juveniles in delinquency actions and in schools~ 
the minor's right to control her own reproductive capaci-
ties by access to contraception or abortion; and the right 
of the non-lJ}arital child to financial support from her or 
his father.23 So far, Supreme Court decisions dealing 
with child rights versus those of their parents or guard-
ians have tended to reflect an inconsistent line of 
reasoning. Hilary Rodham has identified two persistent 
problems of legal theory relative to chHdren's rights: An 
ambivalence about placing limits on parental control, 
and failure on the part of the state to take into account 
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the interests of children and to g~ve competent children 
a chance to speak for themselves. 4 
Basic to the idea of child rights js the necessity to 
recognize the child as a "person" under the law. Al-
though progress toward individual rights for children 
has been uneven, as Martha Minow has observed, the 
movement is particularly sjgn_ificant in that it represents 
"the initiation of a direct relationship between children 
and the state, unfiltered by pa rental involvement but 
maintaining children's special status as peopl~ deserving 
protection from others and from themselves." 5 
Child Labor and the Hazards of Protection 
Strategies developed from time to time by society 
for the protect ion of a specified group of individuals 
against a condition deemed harmful to them has proved 
to be a double-edged experience. Defining a group of 
individuals to be protected necessarily means classifyfog 
individuals into categories of persons with common char-
acteristics and perceived needs. By its very nature, 
however, classification results in disregard for the needs 
and capacities of particular persons within the protected 
group, and inevitably has a constraining influence upon 
consideration of their rights. 
The child labor movement of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century illustrated critical issues in 
attempts to attend to the protection of children. The 
intent of reformers was to end industrial wrongs to 
children, improve social conditions, and assure children's 
public education. Proponents were interested, not in 
intervention into individual family situations, but in the 
larger social system. The goal was structural reform--
political, and secular, based on empirical data. The 
remedy was legislation to regulate attendance at school. 
The movement attracted settlement house residents, 
constitutional lawyers, prominent women reformers of 
-79-
the progressive era, and other politically-minded social 
activists. 
Throughout American history, persistent questions 
have been raised about the meaning and importance of 
work in the development of children. Beliefs and issues 
have changed over time. In colonial days parents and 
society accepted a duty to teach children habits of work 
at an early age. This was considered a necessary 
discipline which would stand children in good stead in 
the face of natural slothful inclinations and would 
prepare them for the demands of a hard life. "Binding 
out," or indenturing poor children to a master workman 
was common. As industry expanded and became mech-
anized in the njneteenth century, public duty included 
putting children into industrial work that would not 
only keep them from idleness, ~gt would also be profit-
able to the towns and colonies. As industry's prof its 
grew, parents, by virtue of their long-established right to 
control of their children, assumed a right to the earnings 
of their children's labors. Many poor parents depended 
upon their children's wages to maintain the family, a 
condition that was cited to justify opposition to child 
labor regulation. 
The tide of moral indignation that arose in the 
face of documented industrial exploitation and harsh 
abuse of children in the mills, factories, and mines, 
coupled with a new concern about a growing illiterate 
and uneducated class of children whose waking hours 
were spent at work, prompted the beginning of a long 
and bitter reform effort to protect children from the 
evils of premature employment. Opposition to reform 
reflected divided public opinion, complex and competing 
interests of employers, and parents' fears of losing 
autonomy in the famHy as well as their children's 
earnings. However, other adult interests were at stake: 
child labor depressed adult wages and could not be 
unionized. Gradually, state by state and industry by 
industry, most children were removed from unregulated 
work and came under the jurisdiction of compulsory 
-80-
education laws. The federal Fair Labor Standards Act 
of 1938 included provisions for the regulation of chi ld 
labor. 
Although some industries and child workers were 
exempt from regulation, child labor reformers succeeded 
in protecting children from the worst of the widespread 
and shocking exploitation of children in industry, an 
achievement of great humanitarian value. Some reform· 
ers believed, however, that chj ld labor regulation, in and 
of itself, was a partial victory in the larger meaning of 
child welfare. They cited the difference between "child 
labor" and "children's work." Substitutes for child labor 
were needed, they said, not only suitable schooling and 
wholesome play, but opportunities for suitable work--
useful work--as an aspect of their preparation for an 
eventual entrance into the labor market.27 Vocational 
education in the schools was tried but the results were 
disappointing. Technology in industry was changing 
rapidly. Students found themselves learning on outworn 
machines, from outdated methods of instruction, trying 
to enter the market with obsolete skills. 
Today it is even harder for children and young 
adolescents to learn work habits and to have confidence-
building work experiences. For many thousands of 
youth sixteen to twenty-one years of age, particularly in 
the central cities, schooling has been a def eating 
experience. They are effectively blocked from the labor 
market and independence in the mainstream of society. 
Job hunting is a depressing and frustrating venture 
which pushes youth further from accomplishment and 
increases apathy and despair. How to institutionalize 
occupational socialization during childhood and growth-
producing work experiences during adolescence, and at 
the same time create a viable entrance into the labor 
market for all segments of our youth, is one of the most 
serious problems of this century. 
The question of rights versus protection for chil-
dren and youth remains a perplexing one. Protective 
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legislation springs from benevolence combined with 
other diverse motives. The hazard of protective legisla-
tion is that it creates an "aura of nurturance that often 
masks the inherent conflict between protection extended 
to the vulnerable and the privileges of citizenship."29 
The award of legal rights to minors, and the efforts of 
parents and the state to protect them, creates dilemmas. 
We are left with a complex problem-·the need to find a 
just and flexible balance in the changing needs and 
rights of parents, child, and state. 
Protection vs. Rights for Women 
Legislation for working women in the twentieth 
century is perhaps a better illustration of the contra-
dictions between benefits and losses, protection and 
rights, that accrue to a protected group. An embittered 
conflict in the 1920s among f em.inists over protective 
legislation versus equal rights split the coalition of 
women who had stood together in the fight for suffrage. 
Between I 900 and 1920, through the efforts of re-
formers, most of the states passed statutes with varying 
restrictions oo women's w9rk--the maximum hours 
women could work, prohibition of night work, and other 
restrictions of varying kinds in industries regarded as 
dangerous to women's health, welfare, morals, or capa-
city for motherhood. Advancing women in industry had 
been an important goal of the feminist movement. Dif-
ferences ex..isted, however, as to what were appropriate 
strategies to pursue. 
Male labor unionists were little interested in or-
ganizing women into the movement, prompting feminists 
to turn to protective legislation. Passage of protective 
legislation among the states was regarded as a clear 
victory by social feminists who, along with the few 
trade union women, had witnessed the oppressive condi-
tions fa which working class women labored for long, 
exhausting hours. These reformers perceived poor and 
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immigrant working women as in need of protection-not 
because they were personally inadequate and helpless, 
but because they had come into an inferior social, 
economic and political status upon their arrival in this 
country and were coping with enormous change in their 
lives. Most were poorly educated, desperate for work, 
and easily exploited. Proponents of the legislation 
considered it a triumph for a large and highly 
vulnerable segment of working women. 
Support for the new legislation came from Jane 
Addams of Hull-House; Lillian Wald of Henry Street 
Settlement; Alice Hamjlton, a physician who had 
documented the disastrous effect upon the health of 
women and men in the "dangerous trades/ Florence 
Kelley of the National Consumers League; Julia Lathrop 
of the Children's Bureau; Grace Abbott of the Chicago 
Immigrants Protective League; social investigators 
Sophonisba Breckinridge, Edith Abbott, Mary McDowell, 
and Josephine Goldmark, all of whom provided author-
itative facts of the conditions of women workers--all 
these and more. 
However, in the 1920a a small, more radical, and 
highly vocal group of feminists, under the aegis of the 
National Women's Party, (NWP) challenged the concept 
of protection and abandoned it in favor of efforts to 
secure an equal rights constitutional amendment. The 
NWP attracted competent highly motivated, successful, 
middle-class business and professional women. Alice 
Paul was the acknowledged dynamic leader, and Mrs. 
Alva Belmont the financial "angel" of the NWP. Others 
who were attracted to the movement for equal rights 
included such diverse individuals as Edna St. Vincent 
Millay; Gloria Swanson; Amelia Earhart; Mrs. John T. 
Raskob, wife of the president of Genera l Motors; M 
Carey Thomas, president of Bryn Mawr College; Gail 
LaughHn, first president of the National Federation of 
Business and Professional Women's ~tubs; and others of 
sim ilar social or professional status. O By the early 
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1920s the differences between the equal rights 
proponents were irreconcilable. 
Social feminists who defended protective legisla-
tion had worked for suffrage as a matter of justice, but 
also they wanted the vote as a means of influencing the 
evolrtion of society--for "the good they could do with 
it.113 The more militant advocates had based their 
appeal for suffrage on the issue of justice alone. An 
equal rights amendment, in their view, was the next step 
after suffrage, based upon the same principle that had 
justified the vote for women--women as individual 
human beings, rather than persons treated collectively, 
without recognition of their individual interests and 
capabilities. They emphasized that placing women in a 
special group requiring protection only diminished their 
claim to rights and reinforced the notion of a biological 
determination of women's roles. They held that protec-
tive legislation had confined women to low-payi ng and 
over-crowded jobs. An equal rights amendment would 
give women in the labor force the same opportunities as 
men were given so that "vigorous and highly skilled 
women could no longer be requi~ed to 'set theit pace 
with the weakest of their sex'."3 
Social feminists acknowledged that protection for 
working women might not be in the best interests of 
particular women, but insisted that an equal rights 
amendment would necessarily promote the interests of 
an upper class against a lower class of women whose 
problem was exploitation, not exclusion. An equal rights 
amendment would nullify all the protective legislation 
they had struggled so hard to attain, and they were 
outraged. 
The suggestion of an equal rights amendment for 
women never received serjous consideration among law-
makers. The social, economic, and political climate was 
against it, not modified by the disruptive and often 
strident tactics of the National Women's Party, far ahead 
of its time. However, by the end of the J 920s and the 
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early J930s, support for protectionist sentiments grad-
ually weakened by a growing commitment to labor 
reform for both men and women, finally reflected in the 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. 
In the years following, most of the protective 
legislation that social feminists had won during the first 
three decades of the twentieth century was dismantled. 
New awareness and new actions among feminist groups, 
and step-by-step legal decisions confirming equality of 
opportunity between the sexes, were having a far reach-
ing impact. As Carl Degler summed it up, "The old 
battle between the militants of Alice Paul's National 
Women's Party and the social feminists and suffragists 
of the 192~j has been resolved decisively in favor of the 
militants." 
However, one cannot dismiss the effort of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century social fem-
inist reformers. These women were keenly aware of the 
burdens that low-income women carried and their sense 
of social responsibility led them to be advocates of these 
oppressed women. Faced with formidable obs tat I es, they 
used their own life experiences and their keen intellect 
to alleviate hardships of women at work. In the early 
part of the century, feminist ideology had not evolved to 
its present-day level of complexity and richness. The 
basic contradiction between protective legislation and 
feminist ideology was not so readily discerned. Their 
efforts must be judged in light of the times in which 
they lived and worked. 
ADVANCES AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES 
FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN 
Today many of the basic issues in women's 
equality that the modern women's movement faced have 
largely been resolved; for example, entry into 
professional and scientific education programs, into 
government jobs, and political candidacy. Despite the 
-85-
fact that women receive 68 percent of the average wage 
earned by men, progress js be.ing made as well in the 
"equal pay for equal worth" issue with more than half of 
the states beginning to analyze government jobs to insure 
that those filled ma.inly by women are not unfairly 
undervalued in pay scales. Women are more frequently 
found in positions of leadership, and this is less 
frequently seen as unusual. More women subscribe to 
and take for granted the aims and principles of the 
organized women's movement, even as they deal indi-
vidually with the unfinished tasks of confirming 
equality at home and in the workplace, and with newer 
"women's issu§s" such as the father's role in child-rearing 
after divorce. 4 
A baffling issue is the continuing inability of the 
organized women's movement to gain ratification of an 
equal rights amendment to the Constitution. In this late 
twentieth century, women alone do not bear the respon-
sibi lity to assure their equal rights. It is a clear matter 
of justice for all, too long delayed. 1t is not important 
that now after hard-won legal contests for women's 
rights, the amendment would be mainly symboli'c. Sym-
bols are of great importance and are being venerated 
throughout the country in this bicentennial year of the 
Constitution. Another such refusal of legislators to 
confirm the rights of women could only be viewed as an 
anachronistic grudge, not a considered decision with 
respect to justice. 
At the center of the rejection of a formal 
endorsement of equal rights for women is the tenacity, 
despite sweeping change, with which many citizens hold 
to an emotionat and nostalgic view of what the structure 
of the family should be and the roles that men and 
women should play in it. Throughout the history of 
America, unyielding fear of change in the traditional 
concept of the family has been inherent in every 
organized opposition to rights for women. Yet oei ther 
the state nor the economy have ever supported the 
somewhat romantic traditional concept of the family, 
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except for a brief time for a select group. To quote a 
contemporary feminist, "When over fifty percent of all 
married women with young children are in the labor 
force, it's time to stop blaming the feminists for 
destroying the family. Whatever personal satisfactions 
these women may find at_ work, the cold hard fact of 
American family life today is that it t~kes two incomes 
to live decently and still pay the bills." 5 
Most women who work do so out of necessity of 
one kind or another, and although the pattern is 
changing, they still bear most of the responsibility for 
housework and child care. In a study of the employment 
of women over time, Lynn Weiner identified two persis-
tent themes: the problem of day care for young 
children, a,d the question of structural change in the 
work place. 6 Since women first entered into industrial 
work more than a century ago, the way in which work is 
organized has been a "stress factor" in family life. In 
this highly competitive urban age, family life will 
require a reorganization of the world of work--not only 
at home, but also shorter work weeks for both men and 
women; provisions for maternal and paternal leave when 
children are born, or are ill and need a parent's care; 
and the provision of affordable, flexible child care 
programs during parents' working hours. The benefits 
of pre-school programs have been demonstrated in recent 
studies of high quality Head Start programs. The tech-
nology of curriculum for the development of a child's 
intelligence is established, and if combined with a 
nurturing interest in young children, does not disrupt 
their emotional bonds with their parents. It is an 
international embarrassment that this country lags far 
behind all other industrial countries of the world in 
assuming responsibility for child care facilities for 
working parents. 
There are far greater threats in our society to the 
stability of the family than working women and their 
changing roles. One is the increased proportion of poor 
women and children, "the feminization of poverty." 
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There is a fundamental relationship between family 
income security and child welfare. For many of these 
children and their mothers, there seems to be no escape 
from the harsh effects of life lived in poverty. 
The proportion of children Living i n female-
headed families has more than doubled in the past 
twenty-five years. One of every six white children and 
slightly more than one of every two black children live 
in mother-only families. Almost half of ~II female-
headed families live in extreme poverty.3 Facts are 
ominous with respect to the health and welfare of poor 
women and children. 
Children in poor families lack proper medical 
care. Among poor preschoolers, between 34 and 45 
percent are not adequately immunized against serious 
but preventable diseases, for example measles or 
diphtheria. Furthermore, almost one in four American 
babies is born with its mother having ~ad no prenatal 
care in the early stages of pregnancy.3 Despite medical 
advances, infant mortality rates in impoverished areas 
of our major cities are almost double the national 
average of 10.8 infants per 1,000 live births. Poverty, 
ignorance, and lack of access to proper care contribute 
to this state of aff airs.39 
For some poor women, the Women-Infant• 
Children program (WJC) provides prenatal care and diet 
supplements. A report from the Federal Center for 
Disease Control concludes that the rate of anemia among 
poor children in WIC programs decreased almost two-
thirds from 1975 to 1985. Another study, a five-year 
evaluation by the Department of Agriculture, showed 
that WIC programs of appropriate quality reduce fetal 
and early infant deaths and help to insure normal birth 
weight. Infants of below normal birth weight require 
intensive care, and frequently have to be re-hospitaUzed 
during the first year of li fe. Some are born with 
handicaps that require costly continuing medical care. 
It is tragic that limjted financing restricts the WIC 
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program to barely half of those eHgible.40 If regard for 
human life is not a sufficient reason to provide health 
care for poor families, policy makers might consider the 
value of sound investment principles and the cost-
effectiveness of prevention. 
Lack of child-support payments by fathers 
contributes to the feminization of pover ty. A majority 
of single mothers receive no financial help a t all f rom 
fathers. Many states have been dilatory about fully 
implementing legislation passed by Congress in J 984 to 
remedy child support enforcement. By the end of 1986, 
only twenty-six states had put into effect a key pro-
vision: withholding wages of non-paying absent parents. 
Children born outside of marriage are most unlikely to 
obtain paternal support; only 4 percent of their mothers 
receive payment~ Establishing paternity is the first step 
toward payment. 1 Many of these fathers are presently 
unemployed and unable to pay child support or can do 
so only at low levels and irregularly. Nevertheless, 
possible future financial benefits accruing to children 
from their father's work record, mHitary service, o r 
other unforeseen sources provide a significant r~ason for 
a policy that requires a record of a child's paternity. 
Not to be ignored is a child's future interest in knowing 
about his or her paternal linkage. 
Homelessness has become another serious th reat to 
the status of the family. More than 20 percent of the 
population in shelters for the homeless are children. 
Many other poor families live dangerously close to home-
lessness, not only because they are poor, but because of 
the cuts in construction of low-income housing and 
reduced federal help. Homelessness, the Children's 
Defense Fund remfods us, can devastate f amilies.42 
Hundreds of thousands of teenagers are now 
homeless, according to the National Network of Run-
away and Youth Services. Many are estranged from 
their own families, but at least a third report that they 
have no home at all to which they can return. Some of 
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them are pregnant or already parents.43 They face 
formidable barriers to receiv ing the wide range of help 
that they need. Some are "aging out'' of foster care and 
are unprepared to make the transition to fodependeot 
living. Many of these alienated youth will become our 
disadvantaged parents of the future. 
Poor famiUes, Jack of health care, unemployment, 
homelessness, and lack of marketable skills add up to an 
unjustifiable waste of lives and money. In this 200th 
year of the Constitution, we should be able to do better. 
At different stages of our history, examples can be cited 
of innovative and effective programs of public health, 
education, and work productivity for which the federal 
government and the states have appropriated money in 
order to promote "the general welfare." To obtain new 
programs will require advocacy for diverse family forms 
and tested programs that are both preventive and cost 
effective. 
Change is inherent in the vital society that was 
envisioned in the Constitution. Fuller attention to the 
nurturance, health, education, and work opportµnities of 
our children and youth can substantially reduce fears 
for the future. 
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THE CONSTITUTION AND WELFARE POLICY: 
SOME PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS 
by H.E. Mason 
Reflection on the role of the Constitution in the 
development of public welfare policies and its promise 
for the resolution of current problems is bound to raise 
a number of serious and difficult questions. The 
Constitution serves the American system of government 
in a variety of ways. It is a symbol of the unity of the 
repubHc, setting forth its fundamental goals; it defines 
the federal system, specifying the respective powers, and 
thereby establishfog a framework within which specific 
problems are to be addressed; and it serves as a kind of 
last court of appeal for recalcitrant questions of justice. 
The Constitution is an historical document, framed af a 
particular time in history and clearly marked by that 
time, but it has a continuing role in times that are, in 
many ways, very different. Many of the problems call-
ing for public welfare policies could not have occurred 
at the time of the framing of the Constitution, others 
would have beyond conception by the framers. Condi-
tions of social life have changed in very fundamental 
ways, as have ways of conceiving of the problems of 
social life. Conceptions of illness and health, of work 
and leisure, of race, class, and gender have all changed, 
and attendant upon those changes have come both new 
problems and new perceptions of old problems. 
In the course of these lectures several of the 
participants argued that the Constitution is silent about 
questions of public welfare. That may be true, but it is 
misleading. The critical question is not whether matters 
of welfare policy are expHcitly mentioned in the Consti-
tution, but whether the Constitution provides resources 
for addressing those questions of justice specifically 
involving welfare policies in one way or another. What 
resources the Constitution does provide must, moreover, 
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be understood in terms of a view of constitutional inter-
pretation that recognizes both the historicity and the 
continuing role of the Constitution in our politica l life. 
If the Constitution is to continue to serve as a last court 
of appeal for recalcitrant questions of justice, its lang-
uage must be interpreted in a way which con tinues to 
earn the trust of those who turn to the courts in the 
expectation that justice will be done. That doubtless 
entails taking a very broad view of w hat the language 
of the framers and of courts will allow, but if the 
Constitution is to continue to serve in radically changed 
historical circumstances, nothing less will do. 
There is another feature of problems of publ ic 
policy which complicates any consideration of the 
particular role of the Constitution to the solution of 
social problems. Some of its language may tempt a 
citizen to find there a mandate for public action in 
relief of pressing human problems, but the history 
recounted in this series of lectures shows the role of the 
Constitution to be both more indirect and more complex. 
Particular policies and programs tend to be instituted in 
response to relatively specific problems and needs, often 
serving purposes that are ambiguous at best. Arguments 
in favor of specific welfare programs tend to be local 
and specific, not general. Rather than proceeding from 
general principles or ideals, they tend to be directed 
toward particular problems and needs, and particular 
groups of people. It is common for activists and reform-
ers to describe the plight of people in one circumstance 
or another, exhibiting the need for a particular program. 
Such arguments may appeal to the sympathy and concern 
and sense of fairness of the public, but they can only be 
thought to appeal very jndirectly to the general welfare 
of the people or of the nation at large. The Constitution 
may provide a kind of framework within the context of 
which specific problems can be addressed, but, political 
rhetoric aside, it rarely, if ever, serves as a primary 
determining factor. The Constitution may permit or for-
bid particular social programs, but it can rarely be said 
to require them. 
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The particularity and relative independence of 
specific social welfare programs are further complicated 
by their ambiguous motivation. As Professor Katz 
observed, such programs are often introduced in the face 
of pressure in times of social crisis, serving social 
control as much as the ostensible needs in question, and 
the particular course of their development may be more 
a matter of accidental political factors than rational 
social planning. Once established, programs come to 
have a life of their own, developing their own insti-
tutional momentum, with attendant problems and needs, 
and they engender both hostile and favorable responses. 
The course of development is, in Professor Katz's phrase, 
dialectical. The result is a patchwork at best, and 
judgments of its justice a re bound to be fragile. 
There is a form of argument encouraged by the 
Constitution that is especially appropriate to institu-
tional patchworks. That is the appeal for equal 
protection. Where one citizen receives as a matter of 
course a fo rm of public aid, then, other things being 
equal, citizens similarly situated are commonly supposed 
to be entitled to the same public aid. If the co~nty 
plows your roads, then, other things being equal, I have 
the right to expect the county to plow my roads~ if your 
water is tested by the state, I have a right to have my 
water tested as well. The principle in question is well 
known and commonly acknowledged. It is commonly in-
voked in demanding the extension of social services 
from one class of citizens to another, and while it is not 
always honored, it is difficult to ignore. Not all dif-
ferences of treatment are reasonable candidates for 
remedy under the equal protection clause of the Consti-
tution. But the question raised in this series of lectures 
is whether the language of that constitutional provision 
can be reasonably refused application to some of the 
deep and continuing inequities of treatment cited in the 
lectures. 
ln the course of this series of lectures an unhap-
pily large number of deep and continuing inequities of 
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treatment have been mentioned: one-fourth of the chil-
dren under six in this country live in families below the 
poverty level, and tend to receive less than the minimum 
daily nutritional level for children of their age; a 
substantia 1 proportion of the families below poverty line 
are single-parent families headed by females; as many as 
thirty-seven million people in the country are without 
medical insurance; a substantial proportion and a dispro-
portionate number of young black males are unem-
ployed. Unfortunately, if predictably, the public percep-
tion of these inequities is beclouded by myths. The 
facts go unrecognized, or the causes are attributed to 
indolence and incapacity, or to personal vice or 
irresponsibility. The circumstances of the middle class, 
on the other band, are euphemistically described; many 
of the causes of their more fortunate position left 
unacknowledged. It is commonly thought, for example, 
that corporate health plans are financed by private 
contributions, and the actual contribution of both the 
government and consumers in the form of tax write-offs 
and consumer costs go unacknowledged. Or, to take 
another example, there is little recognition that a 
bomeowner's interest deduction is no less a transfer of 
income than proposals for a negative income tax. At a 
deeper level, resistance stems from deep and continuing 
hostility to people and groups perceived to be 
undeserving. 
In these and a great many comparable and com-
monly recognized ways. inequities of treatment and deep 
and continuing problems go unaddressed and come to 
seem recalcitrant and impossible of resolution. Where 
the inequity is both genuine and continuing, and the 
affected classes can be plausibly defined and feasible 
remedies specified, it is reasonable to expect equal 
protection from the courts. What explicit promise the 
Constitution holds for the relief of continuing problems 
of social welfare almost certainly lies in that direction. 
lf provision for equality of educational opportunity can 
be brought within the domain of the courts, it is, for 
example, only reasonable to expect fundamental condi-
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tfons of the intellectual and personal development of the 
very young to be a matter of judicial concern. But 
given hostiJe or unreceptive courts, the contribution of 
the Constitution can be at best much more indirect, 
defining a structure within which solutions can be 
sought through legislation. The accommodating role of 
the Constitution, allowing interrelated initiatives at the 
private, state and federal levels, is nicely illustrated in 
Professor Grob's account of the development of policies 
concerning mental health. It must be said, moreover, 
that as political action takes the place of appeal to the 
courts, the range of possible considerations is broadened 
immeasurably. Within the political realm i t is at least 
possible for both prudence and human concern to join 
with a concern for justice in the face of human prob-
lems. Consider the resentment of the working poor 
toward those unemployed people who are eligible for 
government-financed medical care denjed them because 
of their employment. In the political consideration of 
that issue, a prudent concern that the working poor 
continue to seek employment can be conjoined with 
judgments of manifest unfairness of their treatment. 
' Considering the indirect, and, in a way, receding 
role of the Constitution in the development of social 
welfare policy, it is not surprising that the Constitution 
should have received relatively little mention in the 
course of these lectures. The problems have been, and 
doubtless will continue to be, primarily political. The 
more difficult questions concern the possibility of a 
public consciousness concerned over deep and continuing 
inequities, and ready to sustain the effort to address 
them. As the public response to the Roe v. Wade decision 
has shown, that is particularly true where common atti-
tudes and established institutions are threatened. If, as 
Professor Costin suggests, some of the deepest and most 
serious problems are structural in nature, it seem highly 
unlikely that they will be addressed without a renewed 
sense of public concern and responsibility. Whether such 
problems can be addressed within the Constitutional 
framework is the most difficult question posed by this 
series of lectures. 
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EPILOGUE 
The papers prepared for the bicentennial forum 
celebrating the 200th birthday of the Constitution were 
delivered at a time of intense debate. Thurgood 
Marshall, the only black associate justice on the U.S. 
Supreme Court, declared that the Constitution was 
defective from the start, noting the absence of a moral 
principle denouncing slavery and the subjugation of 
women. Spokespersons for the Reagan Administration 
seized the unfolding debate to assert the concept of 
"original intent" and introduced the notion of "the new 
federalism" looking toward a literal interpretation of the 
constitution to shift responsibilities to state and local 
governments. At the same time, powerful arguments for 
a dynamic view of the Constitution were put forth by 
judicial figures such as William J. Brennan, Jr., an 
associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. He observed 
that while the Constitution, and particularly the Bill of 
Rights, declares certain values to be immutable, the 
genius of the document is the adaptability of its prin-
ciples to current problems and current needs. in the 
words of Justice Brennan, "Recognition of so-called 'new 
property' rights in those receiving government 
entitlements affirms the essential dignity of the least 
fortunate among us by demanding that government treat 
with decency, integrity, and consistency those dependent 
on its benefits for their very survival. After all, a 
legislative majority initially decides to create govern-
mental entitlements; the Constitution's due process clause 
merely provides protection for entitlements thought 
necessary by society as a whole. Such due process rights 
prohibit government from imposing the devil's bargain 
of bartering f way human dignity in exchange for human 
sustenancy ... " In this view, the constitutional vision of 
human dignity requires the words of the text to be 
interpreted for a meaning in our time. 
-103-
Each of the presented papers noted that one of 
the most fundamental issues in constitutional history has 
been the definition of the powers of federal, state, and 
local government. The role of the federal government to 
intervene on behalf of the welfare of the nation's 
citizens was severely limited for almost 150 years, except 
in rare instances (the Sheppard-Towner Act authorizing 
federal grants to the states for maternal and infant 
health care and several disaster relief programs for 
earthquake, flood and drought victims). The harsh in-
equalities of economic and social life visited upon 
vulnerable populations of the poor, the mentally ill, and 
women and children appeared to be immune from consti-
tutional challenge for a significant portion of the 
nation's history. 
Indeed, the use of the Constitution to achieve 
economic and social justice js a relatively recent 
phenomenon. The crucial tests came just over fifty 
years ago when New Deal initiatives to remedy the 
catastrophic economic problems of the Great Depression 
were challenged as unconstitutional. Among the judicial 
challenges to various parts of the Social Secur'ity Act, 
the decision upholding the old-age insurance program is 
instructive. Using the taxing power of Congress as the 
constitutional legitimacy for provision for the elderly, 
the Court adopted the position that old-age benefits 
would promote the general welfare of the nation. 
Justice Cardozo's opinion is generally regarded as 
representing a significant constitutional development in 
establishing broad congressional powers to tax and spend 
for the general welfare.2 
The hope behind this statute is to save 
men and women from the rigors of the 
poor house as well as from the haunting 
fear that such a lot awa its them when 
journey's end is near. 
Congress did not improvise a judgment 
when it found that the award of old age 
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benefits would be conducive to the general 
welfare... A great mass of evidence was 
brought together supporting the policy 
which finds expression in the act ... More 
and more our population is becoming 
urban and industrial instead of rura l and 
agricultural. The evidence is impressive 
that among industrial workers the younger 
men and women are preferred over the 
older. In times of retrenchment the older 
are commonly the first to go, and even if 
retained, their wages are likely to be 
lowered. 
The plight of men and women at so low an 
age as 40 is ha rd, almost hopeless, when 
they are driven to seek for reemployment ... 
With the loss of savings inevitable in 
periods of idleness, the fate of workers 
over 65, when thrown out of work, is little 
less than desperate ... 
The problem is plainly national in area • 
and dimensions. Moreover, laws of the 
separate states cannot deal with it effect-
ively Congress, at least, had a basis for 
that belief ... Only a power that is national 
can serve the interest of alJ. 
In this Hght, tracing the transformation of the 
federal government from silence into an active partner 
on behalf of the vulnerable populations of the poor, the 
mentally ill, and women and children becomes the uni-
fying theme of the three papers presented here. 
Michael Katz, in his paper "Poverty and PubHc 
Policy," illuminates our ambivalent response to poverty 
that remains persistently characterized by an intricate 
mixture of altruism, hostility, and neglect. As we see in 
the various phases of the welfare debate, reform is 
almost always followed by denunciations and charges of 
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failure. Ideological differences on what level of 
government should bear the burden of support pervade 
the arguments. 
Katz reminds us that the search for the causes of 
poverty stretches back into the beginning of our history 
as a nation. He reveals to us how persistently we have 
located the source of poverty in character flaws rather 
than in external circumstances dealing with the struc-
tures of the labor market, the institution of education 
and its access, the social class structure, and the factor 
of racial discrimination. We have always had a ten-
dency to search for causes in personal behaviors, such as 
alcohol abuse, laziness, and sexual behavior. It is trus 
perception which easily translates into a justification of 
mean and punitive policies. 
Katz notes that the moral definition of poverty 
has been deeply embedded in Western culture, which has 
fervently embraced the concept of deserving and un-
deserving poor. Invidious distinctions among categories 
of dependent people have persisted throughout time. 
He stdkes a warning note. We now ha vc almost 
resigned ourselves to a classification of poor known as 
"the underclass," a definition of poor people whose 
behaviors and values transform their poverty into an 
enclosed and self-perpetuating world of dependence. He 
notes that this bas brought a mixture of alarm and hos-
tility. He rightfully asks whether this classification is 
a justification for quarantining the poor with the label 
"undeserving." 
It jg historians such as Michael Katz who disclose 
to us that the most ancient and enduring fear we have 
about poverty is our fear of dependency and the belief 
that welfare might erode the will to work. Perhaps that 
is why the pariahs among the poor have always been un-
employed men. More recently, however, it is mothers of 
young children who have lost their place as the 
deserving poor. 
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In a sharp conclusion, Katz notes that rarely have 
we seen a shift in the status or sentiment accorded to 
the poor. Rather, demographics and politics based on 
ideas about the poor, the economy, and the responsible 
level of government have intertwined to shape responses. 
Turning to the second paper, "Mental Illness and 
American Society," Professor Gerald Grob reiterates the 
significance of the definition of the powers of federal, 
state and local government. The diverse ways in which 
the American people have responded to mental illness is 
mirrored in the story of the contending interests of three 
levels of government in provision of resources and stan-
dards of treatment. The late entrance of the federa l 
government as an active partner is noted by the fact 
that the National Institute of Mental Health is not quite 
forty years old. 
The founding of state mental hospitals (by the 
Civil War each state had one) along with the develop-
ment of local almshouses which also cared for the 
mentally ill revealed the contentious overlapping govern-
mental jurisdictions and wide variations in the•treatment 
of the mentally ill that characterized early history and 
continues even today. Grob traces historical develop-
ments in a way that reveals the pivotal importance of 
knowing the distinctive American framework of govern-
ment. This leads to a compelling need to understand the 
politics of assigning the level of government that is to 
be responsible and the fiscal arrangements associated 
with these policy decisions. 
A number of different developments converged to 
produce the "deinstitutionallzation" era of the 1970s. 
This movement emphasized a "community treatment" 
strategy which indirectly attacked the legitimacy of 
state hospitals. It is Grob's contention that the 
transformation of the federal government as an active 
partner in the mental health field is the decisive factor 
in the movement away from state institutional care to a 
local community-based menta l health system. Grob's 
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history of the shift in thinkjng from institutional care 
to community care and treatment is instructive. Changes 
in the character of the patient population were occur-
ring with a rising proportion of aged patients. At the 
same time, the unyielding size of chronically ill patients 
for whom no therapeutic intervention was available 
(cerebral arteriosclerosis and Huntington's Chorea, for 
example) produced high costs for state institutions. The 
introduction of psychotropic drugs reinforced the belief 
that treatment could be provided in the community. But 
again, Grob returns to his theme that the critical factor 
in the continuing obsolescence of the state institutions 
was a political decision that reassigned responsibilities 
for the care of the mentally ill to a local level of 
government. The passage of Medicaid and Medicare leg-
islation stimulated the growth of nursing homes for the 
long term care of the aged, thus facilitating the transfer 
of costs from the state to the national government. A 
"mental health" system was created and the local com-
munity mental health center became its linchpin. 
Because the role and function of the community mental 
health center had little to do with the care of the 
severely and chrorucally mentally ill, an unintended 
consequence was the fact that this population slipped 
out of focus. With the phasing out of state institutions 
and alternative community facilities developing at an 
excruciatingly slow rate, the chronically mentally ill as a 
general population have been neglected. 
Grob's history of mental health policy gives us 
troubling insights into the workings of a constHutional 
system that divides authority among different levels of 
government 
Finally, Professor Lela Costin in her paper, "The 
Welfare of Families and Children," also refers to the 
silence of the Constitution on the rights of a vulnerable 
population. In tracing the 200 year struggle to obtain 
social justice and equality for women, Professor Costin 
provides vivid details on the tenacity of patriarchal 
thinking which was firmly embedded in the culture of 
the founding fathers and changed only at a painfully 
slow pace thereafter. 
Professor Costin's account of the intertwined his-
tory of property, the family, marriage, and guardianship 
of children reveals the gender and social class bfas that 
was intricately woven through state statute's. The 
exploitation of children as exposed in the- child labor 
movement, the hard-fought battle to obtain the basic 
right of citizenship for women, and the right to vote 
disclose the struggle to eliminate injustices that stemmed 
from the original silence of the Constitution. 
A poignant note is recorded by Professor Costin 
in the divisive fight over protective legislation for 
working women which split the ranks of women social 
reformers. The struggle between proponents of an equal 
rights amendment and those who felt that such an 
amendment would nullify protective legislation which 
was in the interest of poor working women remained 
irreconcilable. Almost eighty years later one is struck 
with the profound irony that women have not gained an 
equal rights amendment, nor have they achievo,d equality 
in the work place. 
The history of the welfare of women and chil-
dren is a powerful reminder that the Constitution was 
structured by and for the gender relationship of the 
eighteenth century. The limitations of women's role in 
society was rooted in premises of a deeply ingrained 
ideology that consigned women to the private sphere of 
domesticity and men to the public sphere of power and 
politics. 
These original premises, firmly rooted in the 
"separate spheres" ideology were seized, until very 
recently. as the rationale for reinforcing the legal, social 
and economic inequalities between men and women. 
The task for the future, as Lela Costin asserted, 
is to push ahead for full constitutional protection to 
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ensure equality and autonomy to guarantee that women 
stand, without a trace of discrimination, as decision-
makers and agents of their own destiny. 
In these papers, we have been shown a society 
whjch frequently raises challenges to the concept of a 
federal authority committed to promoting "the general 
welfare." In times of severe economic dislocations with 
catastrophic events of AIDS, homelessness, and the 
deteriorating economic status of segments of the popula-
tion, thorny issues of balancing federal, state, and local 
responsibilities are especially acute. 
Clearly, the nation is still divided on a trouble-
some set of issues. The political acceptance of finite 
resources for social welfare poses a serious question: 
How do we distribute social welfare assistance among 
vulnerable groups of people in a framework of social 
responsibility? And the lingering questfon remains: 
What level of government should be responsible for mov-
ing the natfon's unfinished business to provide equality 
and social justice for all its citizens? 
The debate proceeds with an intuitive knowledge 
that constitutional guarantees are grounded in a sense of 
social justice which is derived from the interplay 
between the changing needs of the nation and evolving 
insights about equality and liberty. 
The Constitution remains in the true sense, a Ii v-
ing document, a dynamic source of interpretation for the 
nation's search for ways to promote the general welfare. 
Esther Wattenberg 
Professor, School of Social Work 
Program Specialist 
Center for Urban & Regional Affairs 
University of Minnesota 
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NOTES 
1. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., "Interpreting the 
Constitution," Social Policy, Summer, 1987, p. 27. 
2. Justice Cardozo's Opinion, as cited in 
"Constitutional Background to the Social Security 
Act of J 935," Social Security Bulletin, January 
1987, Vol. 50, No. l, p. 11. 
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